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I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine a very large circle on a two-dimensional plane. We will call this circle
the world. Imagine within this very large circle millions of other, overlapping
circles, each a different color, with varying sizes and degrees of intensity, or
brightness. Now imagine that each of these many circles is a self-acknowledged
group of people, bound by some collective identity or commonality of belief or
purpose. At the circumference of each circle is a boundary, pushing members
inwards towards the core, while limiting intrusion from without. The size of each
circle is determined by the number of people who feel a part of that group. The
brightness of each circle is determined by the intensity with which those people feel
connected to each other, and the degree to which their identities are formed by
membership in that group. No circle is of precisely the same color. A single circle
may be as small and bright as a close-knit family; likewise, a circle may be as large
(and likely dull, or un-bright) as an entire nation, or even the entire world. A single
person may simultaneously be in numerous circles of varying brightnesses (thus the
overlapping), but, one imagines, it would seem there is a finite amount of brightness
a single person could exude without feeling “over-committed”. Thus, in the
aggregate, the more people that belong to numerous circles, the larger and less bright
those circles become.
It would seem a bit ridiculous to label each of these circles a community—at
their least bright, some of these circles might represent people with the same longdistance telephone service, or who share the same favorite flavor of ice cream. Yet,
it is difficult to distinguish a non-community-circle from a circle that would more
commonly be considered a community. Is it a matter of size? Of brightness? Both?
For now it will suffice to recognize that at some point along the dual continuums of
size and brightness, these circles become recognizable communities. Accordingly,
we might say that each of these circles is a potential community.
Now, think of this view of the two-dimensional, very large circle, with millions
of overlapping circles within it, as simply the top layer of a three-dimensional tube.
Just like the very large circle, each of the smaller circles is just the top of a long tube
that extends beneath the plane. Turn the plane ninety degrees in your mind, so that
the tubes are extending sidelong, rather than vertically. This three-dimensional
object now shows a continuum of time, and each tube expresses a circle (a potential
community) as it extends over time. We will see that the tubes grow and shrink in
size with the numbers of “members” feeling a belonging to those potential
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communities. And we will see that the brightness of the tubes will increase or
diminish over time as well. For example, we could focus in on one particularly large
tube representing the United States of America: we could watch it increasingly grow
in size as this nation’s population has grown, and we could watch its brightness
increase, for example, with the heightened patriotism of the World Wars, and
decrease again soon after. Looking within the U.S.-tube to discover the tube
representing, for example, the American Jewish community, we could watch as that
tube increased dramatically in both size and brightness during the 1920s, remaining
bright for some time as most members of that community lived and worked closely
together in a small number of urban ghettos, and then beginning to lose its brightness
over time as members of the community began to assimilate (to expend more and
more of their tube-brightness on other potential communities). Likewise, we could
see the very large, outermost tube (the potential “global community”) grow steadily
in size and become brighter over the last century, with globalizing improvements in
transportation and communication.
Social critics have expressed concern of late that, for example, with global
communication and transportation at our fingertips, and with increased emphasis on
the workplace, our tubes, though perhaps having increased in number, have
diminished in brightness.2 As the brightnesses of the circles are reduced—due to
both increased circle size and increased overlapping with other circles—the circles
themselves begin to dissipate. It is this circle dissipation that leads these critics to
lament the loss of community in America. They seem to long for an earlier day,
where people felt connected to fewer and smaller, but brighter tubes. They conjure
images of a small village, separated by miles from any other village, in which a small
and homogenous group of people lived, worked, played, and prayed together,
without interference from the outside world. They seem to suggest that today’s
cross-section of the community-tube model would reveal much larger and more
frequently overlapping tubes, each with a far lesser brightness than in cross-sections
of past eras. This does not seem like an inaccurate depiction or an unreasonable
concern. Yet, I believe that it is at least something of an exaggeration to look at
today’s cross-section and say that we are without community—that we are “bowling
alone.”
It is my belief that there are communities out there—communities that are
significant in people’s lives. This paper will attempt to show that the village-style
communities that these critics have idealized, while in their most literal form perhaps
not as common, are indeed analogous to the others that they discount from today’s
America. I will endeavor to show that, while in many instances their forms and
functions may have changed, bright circles of community do exist in America. In
examining some of these circles, then, my method will be to look both to the core of
the community and to its outer perimeter. We shall see, in fact, that these two parts
of the circle are in a symbiotic relationship, each one both relying on and providing
for the other. We shall see how the core values and purposes at the heart of a
community inform the social control mechanisms at its perimeter. Likewise, we
shall see how a community’s social control functions—the two-way street that both
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compels conformity within and prevents infiltration and dilution from without—
perpetuates and reaffirms the values and purposes of the community.
In Section I, I will consider two extreme examples of community (the Oneida
Community of the 19th Century and the Old Order Amish). These are communities
both highly cohesive and highly isolated—they are extremely bright tubes with
sharply delineated circumferences. In Section II, I will discuss a more mainstream
example, Residential Community Associations, which, unlike the communities of
Part I, represent a much more particular and individualistic notion of community.
Section III will consider the community of Harvard College students, which forms an
interesting blend of the tight-knit and life-encompassing nature of the Section I
communities and the individualistic nature of Residential Community Associations.
In Section IV, I will briefly explore, in light of the first three sections, the dangers
and limits of communities, and propose a series of factors that ought to contribute to
any State decision whether to interfere.
With each community considered, I will try to paint a picture of the many
collectivizing factors at work, from the perspective of both the individual members
(or potential-members) and the community as a whole: (1) the history or tradition of
the community; (2) its underlying ideology, belief and value systems, and/or
common interests or goals; (3) the nature of its communalism; (4) the nature of its
isolation from the outside world; and (5) its decision-making and governance
structure. Finally, I will look to its “gate-keeping” or circumference-drawing
functions—how the community controls deviance and maintains unity within, while
distinguishing itself from the chaos without. I hope with each community to shed
some light on both its conceptions of “deviance” and the calculus likely at work in
any individual member’s decision whether to deviate.
Through these several
juxtapositions of community features, I will show that where there is a collective
effort to control deviance—to conform behavior to collectively perceived and
understood norms, and to remove or exclude those whose behavior conflicts with
these norms—there must also be a community of shared beliefs, values, and/or goals
feeding, and being fed by, those efforts.
II. SECTION I
The three communities in this first section represent extreme examples of
community. Even the most skeptical critic would be hard-pressed to deny that these
communities are as cohesive, if not more so, than those communities of old that they
tend to idealize. It is not at all my intention in this first section to argue the mere
existence of these communities, for that is no doubt quite obvious. Rather, this
section is meant to provide a baseline of comparison for the following two sections.3
With this goal in mind, it is perhaps useful to generalize briefly about the
commonalities of these two communities. In placing these communities within the
three-dimensional tube-world model described above, both may be envisioned, in
comparison to other, less extreme communities, as particularly small in diameter,
extremely bright, highly discrete (with few other community-circles overlapping),
and having strong perimeter borders. In other words, these two communities (1)
include relatively small numbers of people; (2) include members who feel extremely

3
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connected to each other, and who consider the community an extremely significant
component of their individual identities; (3) are particularly isolated—physically or
otherwise—from outsiders; and (4) based on the first three characteristics, have
strong mechanisms for social control.
Before proceeding with accounts of these communities, however, a brief
theoretical interlude seems appropriate. Throughout this paper, the several
communities will be compared on a number of levels. Some—size, location, etc.—
will be quite obvious. Others—levels of isolation and communalism, underlying
beliefs and values—will be less obvious. In examining many of these less obvious
features, I will often refer to two interconnected distinctions: (1) the difference
between gemeinschaft and gesellschaft relations, and (2) the difference between
instrumental, affective, and moral orientations. The first of the two distinctions
focuses on types of relations that predominate between community members.4 This
distinction is a tool for examining the nature of the community as a whole. The
paradigmatic example of gemeinschaft relations is a family—“non-rational” relations
based on emotion and affection. Gesellschaft is most easily depicted as a
corporation—“rational” relations based on mutual understanding and external goals.
No community can exist solely in one of these two realms: a family cannot live
peacefully under one roof without deciding who will take out the trash and who will
do the dishes; likewise, a corporation cannot prosper where there are no positive
interpersonal relations to bring to the conference table. But while it may be true that
any functional community must have both these types of relations, one can compare
communities and discover that they do not necessarily present the same balance with
respect to these two types of relations.
The second comparative spectrum aims to distinguish instrumentality, affectivity
and morality as foci of individual orientations towards a social system.5 Where the
gemeinschaft/gesellschaft distinction is concerned with the nature of the community
as a whole, these three orientations should be understood from the perspective of the
individual member or potential member. Where the gemeinshaft/gesellschaft helps
to answer the question “What is this community like?”, this second spectrum helps
us understand why individuals do or do not feel committed to the group. An
instrumental orientation focuses on “the rewards and costs that are involved in
participating in the system.”6 It is the cognitive approach of calculating what the
individual, as an individual, might gain or lose by joining one particular community
rather than another. An affective approach emphasizes emotional connections
between individuals within the community. Finally, the moral orientation is an
evaluative approach concerned with the degree to which the moral norms and
collective beliefs and/or goals of a given community jibe with those of the
individual. Just as with the gesellschaft/gemeinschaft distinction, here too a
4
The gemeinschaft/gesellschaft distinction is one with a long history in the field of
sociology. Its origins and first uses are generally attributed to early social theorists Ferdinand
Toennies, Max Weber, and Emile Durkheim.
5

This trio was put forward by Rosabeth Moss Kanter, in her seminal work on American
communes and the bases for members’ commitment to them. ROSABETH MOSS KANTER,
COMMITMENT AND COMMUNITY: COMMUNES AND UTOPIAS IN SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE
(1972).
6

Id. at 68.
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combination approach must be used in comparing one community (or, more
accurately, the orientations of the individual members comprising a community) to
another. Yet, also as with the gesellschaft/gemeinschaft distinction, communities
vary in the degrees to which each of these orientations are present and
acknowledged. The decision whether to join one type of community will draw on a
quite different set of issues and concerns that will affect the decision whether to join
another type of community. Thus, where a decision whether to take a job flipping
burgers or as an investment banker (and thus to join one or the other community of
employees) would likely draw most heavily on instrumental issues (though perhaps
with some consideration of affective and moral issues as well), the decision to join
one religious congregation over another would probably be informed more heavily
by affective and moral considerations than by instrumental ones.
In looking at these two sets of distinctions together, there is an intuitive sense that
the instrumental orientation maps onto the gesellschaft and the affective orientation
is paired with the gemeinschaft. In other words, it would seem that, in a community
in which gesellschaft relations predominate, an individual member’s commitment to
the group is likely to be based primarily on instrumental considerations; likewise,
intuitively one suspects that, within a gemeinschaft-dominated community,
individual commitment is probably rooted in an affective orientation. While this
intuitive pairing may in many instances be accurate, two qualifications must be
made. First, as discussed briefly above, in looking at these two spectrums, it is vital
to appreciate that they are not concerned with precisely the same descriptive
functions.
The gemeinschaft/gesellschaft distinction aids in describing the
community as a whole: it indicates the role of a given community and the aggregate
nature of the interpersonal relations among its members. Is the community focussed
like a corporation on the completion of certain tasks? Or, more like a family, are the
relations between the individual members the essential element of the community?
The instrumental/affective/moral spectrum, on the other hand, describes the nature of
individual members’ commitment to the group. What issues would a member
deciding whether to desert the community consider in her decision? What desires or
needs would prevent a member from leaving, or make a potential member decide to
join?7
Second, though the intuitive mapping of affectivity onto gemeinschaft and
instrumentality onto gesellschaft may often be accurate, some types of communities
do defy this matching. For example, individual commitment to a gemeinschaftdominated community of participants in group therapy is likely as much, if not more,
7
It is in asking this individually-focussed question regarding the nature of membership
commitment to the group that the element of morality comes in. Though morality does not
map neatly onto either the gemeinschaft or gesellschaft, it is nonetheless often a significant
factor in a person’s calculus when deciding whether to join or to quit a community. In the
Section I communities, the moral orientation is in predominant part focussed on the religious
origins and natures of the two communities. In non-religious communities, as we shall see in
regards to the Residential Community Associations in Section II, the moral orientation would
likely focus not necessarily on beliefs, but perhaps rather on collective goals or purposes. It is
surely not my intention in this paper to evaluate the respective moralities or moral bases of the
communities considered herein. Yet, in order to understand the relation between these
communities and their respective social control functions, we must in part be concerned with
members’ conceptions and levels of acceptance of the moral nature of the respective
communities.

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol49/iss2/5

6

2001]

THE SYMBIOTIC CIRCLE OF COMMUNITY

277

instrumentally-oriented than affectivity-oriented. Though the community of group
therapy is far more appropriately defined by the family-like gemeinschaftian
functions, an individual’s decision to participate is likely informed as much by an
instrumental desire for the individual benefits that therapy might grant as by
affective orientations. With this example we see an instance where the informal,
interpersonal (i.e. gemeinshaft) nature of a community enjoys and relies on an
individualistic, instrumental basis for commitment. These two qualifications will
become important to this paper as we begin to examine the relations between the
natures of various communities and their respective methods of controlling deviance.
Where gemeinschaft/gesellschaft will consider from a group perspective the natures
of the communities, the spectrum of orientations will be concerned with
understanding individual members’ commitment to the group and the nature of their
decisions (conscious or otherwise) whether to deviate from the collective norms and
behaviors of those groups.
A. The Oneida Community
1. Brief History
The Oneida Community was one of a number of efforts during the 19th Century
to escape the increasing industrialization in America. It was the creation of a single
man, John Humphrey Noyes. Born in Vermont in 1811, after a brief stint at a law
firm and two years at theological seminaries, Noyes set out to create a community in
which people would be free to reach their spiritual and moral potential. A variation
on what was known as Christian Perfectionism, Noyes’ belief was that Christ had
already returned to the world, “so that redemption or liberation from sin was an
accomplished fact.”8 Thus, if he could create the right environment, free from the
stresses and corruptive elements of American society, people could lead lives of
perfection, free from sin. Though his evangelistic efforts were great, membership
grew slowly. By 1844, he had established a small community of about two dozen
adult members at Putney, Vermont. As word of the community, and its less-thantraditional ways, spread through northern Vermont, it was met with greater and
greater resentment and contempt. To escape, in 1847 Noyes and his community fled
to Oneida, New York. Once at their new home, Noyes set out to create the type of
community he believed would be conducive to the existence of an earthly perfection.
He emphasized two fundamental principles in applying his Perfectionistic
Christianity to daily life: the possibility of individual perfection and communal
living.9
8

WILLIAM M. KEPHART, EXTRAORDINARY GROUPS 94-95 (1982).

9

The Community at Oneida was to prosper for another thirty years. As their notoriety
grew, so too did the pressure from outside forces, much as it did in the Putney years, against
their “un-American” practices. Simultaneously, internal conflict grew as well, from two
primary sources. First, the Community suffered a burst of deviant behavior and opposition
sentiment from the second generation of Oneidans, who were born into the Community, rather
than affirmatively choosing to join. The second source of conflict stemmed from a new
member, James W. Towner, whose own charismatic leadership rivaled Noyes’ and inspired a
divisive minority of members to emerge. [Interestingly, Barbara Fishbein argues that the basis
of the dissention was that Towner, a lawyer, advocated the replacement of the informal social
control mechanisms with legal authority. Barbara Fishbein, Justice Without Law? Resolving
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2. Perfectionism
For the Oneidans, individual perfection and communal living were in no way
exclusive; indeed, it was Noyes’ belief that only through a communal existence, in
which his brand of Christianity permeated every moment of daily life, could people
reach perfection. As Noyes himself said, the community was not intended to “call
people away from their homes and employments to attend to religion,” but instead to
turn “their very arrangements for getting a living into the essential conditions of a
school and church .”10 It would thus be everyday life, rather than specific moments
in a church or in a classroom, that would nurture the spiritual growth towards
perfection of the members of the Oneida Community.11 As each person contributed
to the overall virtue of the environment, the perfection of which, they felt, was a
prerequisite for individual perfection, members’ fates were thus necessarily
intertwined.12 Accordingly, in considering the other major aspects of Oneida life, it
is vital to keep in mind that they were not necessarily the result solely of earthly
practical considerations, but were also inspired by the community’s spiritual quest
for perfection.
3. Communal Life
Only through communal living, Noyes believed and taught his followers, could
the people of Oneida create the type of environment that might enable them to reach
perfection. This spirit of communalism would not inform simply the economic
structure of the community; rather, it would permeate every aspect of life at Oneida.
From group living arrangements and a community dining hall, to uniform hair styles
and manners of dress, it was the goal of the Oneida to create the type of gemeinshaft
relations and intensely affective orientation that might nurture a community-wide
primary group.13 Even the most gesellschaftian of functions, for example the

Disputes Without Lawyers, 18 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 613, 614. (1983)] In 1877, Noyes
resigned as leader of the Oneida, and two years later, in fear of possible legal charges in
connection with his leadership of the Community, Noyes fled to Canada, never to return.
Without his guidance and inspiration, the rigid and defining practices of the Community faded
with time, and on January 1, 1881 the community was dissolved. It did not, however, cease to
exist as a business. With a net worth of $600,000, a joint-stock company was formed in the
name of Oneida Ltd. In 1967, Oneida Ltd. went public on the New York Stock Exchange,
where its stock is still traded. More on Oneida Ltd. may be found on the internet at
http://www.oneida.com.
10

G. W. Noyes, Episodes in the Life of John Humphrey Noyes, COMMUNITY QUADRANGLE,
Dec. 1927, at 6.
11

For a more detailed understanding of the religious underpinnings of the Oneida version
of Christian Perfectionism, as described by the Community itself, refer to THE ONEIDA
COMMUNITY, HANDBOOK OF THE ONEIDA COMMUNITY, NO. 2 (1871).
12

This is a variation on what is sometimes called “interconnected welfare,” which Mark D.
Rosen defines as “the view that an individual’s prospects for self-actualization are inextricably
connected to how other individuals in her community behave and believe. Mark D. Rosen,
The Outer Limits of Community Self-Governance in Residential Associations, Municipalities,
and Indian Country: A Liberal Theory, 84 VA. L. REV. 1053, 1066 (1998).
13
“A primary group is a small, face-to-face group characterized by intimate relationships
and shared feelings, such as the family, the clique, the friendship circle. A secondary group,
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centrally assigned and constantly shifting work duties, were communalized to inspire
heightened interpersonal, gemeinschaft relations between members. No function
within the community was purely functional; each had its own social and
interpersonal function as well. Each member of the community was to think of every
other member with an equal degree of attachment and identification, no single
member figuring more prominently in one’s mind than another.
An extreme example of this is to be found in their practice of “complex
marriage.” Noyes and the Oneidans believed that “it is not desirable for two
persons…to become exclusively attached to each other—to worship and idolize each
other—however popular this experience may be with sentimental people
generally.”14 Accordingly, under this institution, every member had sexual access to
every adult member of the opposite sex, with special care given to ensure that no two
people spent more time together than with any others. Contrary both to the popular
belief of the outside world at the time and to the quite different variations instituted
by the more modern communal societies of the 1960s, however, complex marriage
was not “free love.”15 Indeed, it was a highly regulated and monitored program,
intended further to engender solidarity and subvert the possibility of special
relationships considered dangerous to the spirit of a community-wide primary
group.16
This effort to eviscerate the possibility of sub-groups or exclusive relationships
within the community as a whole extended throughout Oneida life. Children were
raised communally, and were reprimanded for showing any special affection for any
other member, particularly their parents. Work assignments among the adults were
changed frequently, to avoid any potential work-related exclusive relationships.
Analogously, material goods were owned collectively, so that no one could acquire
special affection for any object. Even spending too much time alone was frowned
upon by the Community, as it indicated self-importance rather than the spirit of
community. The essence of the Oneida Community was to be found in its communal
spirit, and in this communal spirit, they believed, was the key to earthly perfection.

on the other hand—such as the large corporation, the business firm, or the government
bureau—is characterized by an impersonality of association.” KEPHART, supra note 8, at 99.
14

THE ONEIDA COMMUNITY, HAND-BOOK OF THE ONEIDA COMMUNITY 14-15 (1867).

15

It is probably more useful to think of complex marriage not along the lines of free love,
but rather in comparison with the complete celibacy practiced by such of the Oneida’s
contemporaries as the Shakers. Thus, complex marriage among the Oneida should be thought
of much as celibacy was for the Shakers, as the solution to the potential problem of exclusive
relationships within the community as a whole.
16

Though solidarity was the main underlying purpose behind complex marriage, Noyes
took great care to cite as the basis for complex marriage passages from the Bible:
In the kingdom of heaven, the institution of marriage—which assigns the exclusive
possession of one woman to one man—does not exist (Matt. 22:23-30).
In the kingdom of heaven, the intimate union, which in the world is limited to pairs,
extends through the whole body of believers. . . . (John 17:21). KEPHART, supra note
8, at 121.
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4. Isolation
That Noyes chose as the home for his community the rural and isolated nature of
Oneida, New York, was no coincidence.17 After its community relations problems in
Putney, the Community knew it was in its best interest to avoid any more contact
than necessary with the outside world. And, as Kanter explains, “[t]he feeling of ill
will was mutual.” 18 After all, it was Noyes’ very purpose behind Oneida to create an
atmosphere free from what he perceived as a sinful and corrupting American society.
As Kanter continues, “Oneida scorned the outside world as filthy and
contaminating….Oneida children were horrified by the swearing and depravity of
village boys. Children were forbidden to speak to outsiders…. After visitors had
left, the community gathered for a ritual cleaning ‘bee,’ to efface every trace of an
‘unclean public’ and of the ‘filthy invaders’.”19 Likewise, a special cleansing ritual
was required for any member before temporarily leaving the community, and upon
his or her return. Centered around the Mansion House, in which the entire
community lived, the Oneida were an extremely insular community. Its collective
frame of reference hardly ever extended beyond its own physical, interpersonal and
psychological boundaries to the outside community, to which the Oneida tellingly
referred to as “the World.” Whether intentionally or not, the intense isolation of the
Oneida Community, by cutting external ties and insulating itself from the contempt
of the World, further enhanced the solidarity and sense of shared values and goals of
its members.20

17

For a telling description of the area surrounding the Community, and of the effort
necessary to visit it, see THE ONEIDA COMMUNITY, supra note 11, at 3-5.
18

KANTER, supra note 5, at 18.

19

Id.

20

In discussing the effects of isolation on the solidarity of the Community, I do not intend
to overlook the difficult issue of whether, in practical reality, members actually perceived
themselves as free and able to quit the Community. Particularly for members who had lived at
Oneida for a considerable time, and perhaps even more particularly for the later members who
were born at Oneida, the decision to quit the Community surely involved the surmounting of
serious obstacles. From the interpersonal (affective) ties that would be broken by departure, to
the psychological and practical (instrumental) difficulties of immersion into mainstream
society, to the ideological and religious (moral) ramifications of quitting Noyes’
Perfectionism, the impact of quitting the Oneida Community should not be underestimated.
There is absolutely a thin line (or perhaps more precisely, none at all) between the affirmation
of collective values through social pressure and isolation and the eradication of the free will of
individual members. With increased isolation so too grows a member’s reliance on the
Community, for interpersonal, economic and social needs. This is not a theme I will tackle
squarely in this paper, but to ignore it wholly would be to leave out an essential element.
Thus, I will touch on the issue, at least tangentially, throughout this paper. The key, for now,
is to appreciate the issue from two different perspectives. First, as considered in the text above,
is that, from a group/strategic perspective, the affective and instrumental reliance on the
community that intense isolation works to heighten has a significant impact on overall
membership commitment. Where ties with the outside world are cut, people are less able (and
thus less likely) to leave. On the other hand, though, from an individual perspective, where
there are such affective and instrumental barriers to departure from the community, there
ought to be significant concerns about individual members’ rights and freedoms to make their
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5. Organizational Structure
As seems intuitive, the communal nature of the Oneida Community lent itself to
an egalitarian organizational and decision-making structure. With the single
exception of Noyes, whose status among the Community was of a divine nature,21
day-to-day decisions were made democratically, with more or less equal
participation from all. The Handbook of the Oneida Community describes as one of
the two “measures relied upon for good government...Daily Meetings, which all are
expected to attend, and in which religious, social and business matters are freely
discussed….”22 Additionally, particular decisions were frequently distributed to any
of the several committees formed by interchangeable mixes of members. In making
these decisions, the Handbook states, “unanimity is always sought by committees, by
the Business Board, and by the Community….If there are serious objections to any
proposed measure, action is delayed until the objections are removed. The majority
never go ahead without leaving a grumbling minority behind.”23
Yet, while these democratic sentiments pervaded both the atmosphere of the
Oneida Community and its official Handbook, it seems that the major decisions
faced by the Community were made either by Noyes alone, or with the assistance of
a small core of “central members,” with the community at large faithfully ratifying
those decisions. To the extent that lay-members acknowledged the undemocratic
nature of these decisions, it seems, they were satisfied by the fact that Noyes, felt by
all to be divinely inspired and whose ideas were the backbone of the Community’s
reason for existing, was the one steering the ship.24 Additionally, considering that
there were at any given time as many as twenty-one committees and forty-eight
departments, it seems understandable that the Oneidans did not protest this
centralizing function, in light of what would otherwise likely have been chaos. With
this blend of egalitarian participatory democracy where possible, supplemented by
centralized authority predominantly in the hands of Noyes, ‘[u]p to the very end, the
Community functioned with scarcely a major quarrel.”25
6. Mutual Criticism
A seemingly natural application of the Oneidans’ religious/moral beliefs in both
egalitarian communal living and the potential for individual perfection, as well as the
strong isolation-inspired gemeinschaft relations and affective ties within the
community, mutual criticism supplied the community with an effective system of

own decisions. This dichotomy will be considered throughout this paper, especially in Section
IV.
21

KEPHART, supra note 8, at 111.

22

THE ONEIDA COMMUNITY, supra note 11, at 17.

23

Id. at 18. Also according to the Handbook, weekly meetings of the Business Board
referred to above, thought of as a corporate board of directors, could be attended and
participated in by any member of the community.
24
MAREN LOCKWOOD CARDEN, ONEIDA 88 (1969). It should be noted that Noyes’ status
also provided him with greater sexual access to other members and exempted him from
receiving mutual criticism (discussed below).
25

KEPHART, supra note 8, at 104.
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social control. Though the system evolved somewhat over the course of the
Community’s existence, the essence of mutual criticism remained the same:
the character of a given member “became the subject of special scrutiny
by all the members….On the presentation of his case each member in turn
was called on to specify, as far and as frankly as possible, every thing
objectionable in his character and conduct. In this way the person
criticized had the advantage of a many-sided mirror in viewing himself, or
perhaps it may be said was placed in the focus of a spiritual lens
composed of all the judgments in the [Community].”26
In this description it is apparent that while mutual criticism may have served a
social control-function, it was not necessarily viewed in this light by the
membership. Rather, it was considered as perhaps the essential nexus between the
possibility of perfection and a communal existence: by enlisting the entire
Community in an individual’s struggle, a sense of interconnectedness and of a shared
struggle and reason for being were consistently reinforced.27 Thus, even the
gesellschaft-oriented problem-solving of social control both relied on and reaffirmed
the affective relations and shared moral authority.28 As testimony to the Oneidans’
appreciation of criticism as a self-help mechanism, it should be noted that members
frequently volunteered to be criticized by the group. The Community also used the
process of criticism as a cure for physical ailments. Calling this version of criticism
“krinopathy,” or hygienic criticism, the Oneidans boldly claim in their handbook on
mutual criticism “to have discovered a new curative.” 29
The social control function of mutual criticism, however, regardless of whether it
was perceived as such by the typical member, was a powerful force at Oneida.
While members often volunteered for criticism, it was also frequently imposed on
particular members when it was felt that their behavior was incongruous with the

26
OFFICE OF THE AMERICAN SOCIALIST, MUTUAL CRITICISM 16-17 (1876). For a more
detailed account of the system of mutual criticism, this text provides instructions on how both
to receive and give criticism. It also includes numerous former members’ first-person
accounts of and reflections on the process.
27
Interestingly, the Community also considered as one of the beneficial functions of
mutual criticism its preemptive nature in providing a more constructive outlet for the voicing
of interpersonal conflicts and contentions inevitable in any close community. As the
Community states in its publication on the subject, “Criticism is not more free with us, but it is
distributed more profitably. We have a systematic plan of distribution, by which the true
article is insured; and it is delivered in the right time and place….In the Community we draw
it off from the mischievous channels of evil-thinking and scandal, and conduct it through plain
speech to a beneficial result.” Id. at 21.
28

In contrast, as we shall see in later sections, in communities without these tremendously
strong affective relations and interpersonal needs and pressures, the functional process of
social control tends to take a much different form. Where there are no affective and moral
connections between members, providing for social pressure to conform and individual needs
to remain within the community, social control must take on a more individualized,
instrumental and strictly gesellschaft approach.
29

Id. at 71.
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Community.30 Thus, mutual criticism served two separate but related functions. On
the one hand, it allowed the group to reaffirm and communicate to each other,
through the substance of their criticisms, their perceptions of what it meant to be a
member of the Oneida Community. And on the other hand, through the nature of the
process of criticism, the Community was empowered through this realization and
reaffirmation of shared values to impose pressure on deviant or potentially deviant
members to conform to these norms. It would seem that without this first element of
collective value affirmation (as might be the case in a less participatory or egalitarian
criticism process), coupled with the severe isolation of the Community and the
barriers to exit engendered by it, the social pressure of the second aspect would not
be nearly as effective. As it was, “[m]utual criticism was effective because
members’ self-esteem depended almost exclusively upon their fellow [members’]
approval.”31 Accordingly, members undergoing criticism were expected to remain
silent during the process, objecting only to the most glaring of factual inaccuracies,
and to receive the criticism with utmost humility and “meekness of spirit”.32 The
process would frequently conclude with the criticized member’s public confession of
faults, and a promise to follow the advice of the Community. The process also
served a convenient self-selection function: those whose lack of humility or belief in
the rightness of the Oneida way (the moral orientation element of commitment)
prevented them from being able to accept such criticism, when faced with the
prospect of a life of mutual criticism, simply left the Community.33
7. Summary
The Oneida Community represents about as extreme an example of an intentional
community as may be found. For the purposes of this paper, in comparing the
Oneida Community to the other two communities in Section I, the Amish and Satmar
communities, five key attributes, all interwoven into the Oneida social fabric, and
each at least to some degree dependent on the others, should be emphasized. First, at
the center of the Oneida value system, and thus at the very heart of their collective
reason for existing, was a strong and unified moral orientation: the belief in the

30

“In the great majority of cases criticism is desired and solicited by individuals…but in
some instances, where it is noticed that persons are suffering from faults or influences that
might be corrected or removed by criticism, they are advised to submit themselves to it. In
extreme cases of disobedience to the Community regulations, or obsession by influences
adverse to the general harmony, criticism is administered by the Community or its leaders
without solicitation on the part of the subject.” Id. at 18.
31

CARDEN, supra note 24, at 74.

32

“If anyone reacted to the criticism with sullen silence or with angry defense, he was
reproved again. Stripped of all social support, he found no reassurance until he submitted
completely to the Community’s judgment. Submission brought Community approval and
personal catharsis.” Id. at 76. This humility and obedience to authority will be compared
below to the similar concept of Gelassenheit, one of the major tenets of the Amish belief
system.
33

On average, between three to five adult members left the community, or “seceded” each
year. Though because this number does not include children, who were generally taken by
seceding parents, the actual number was probably somewhat higher. CARDEN, supra note 24,
at 77.
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potential of every person, if placed in the proper environment, to achieve a perfect
(sin-free) existence. Thus, as will be seen strongly in the other communities in
Section I, religion is not only at the heart of the Oneida ideology and belief system,
but is also impossible to separate from the daily activities of its members. Second, in
providing such a perfection-inspiring environment, the Oneida Community was
communal in nature, with a dominant focus on the collective, rather than on the
individual. Third, the strongly gemeinschaft-oriented organizational and decisionmaking structure was, to a large degree, egalitarian, often requiring intense
participation from, and instilling a sense of involvement in every member. Fourth,
the exception to this egalitarianism may be seen in the divine status and majordecision-authority granted by the Community to its founder and charismatic leader,
John Humphrey Noyes. Fifth, the Community was intensely isolated, both
physically and psychologically, from American society, effectively eviscerating
individual members’ interpersonal, social, political, or moral connections to the
“World.”
All of these five factors together contributed both to a very defined set of
communally held beliefs, values, goals, and norms, and to a climate of intense social
relations and individual reliance on social connectedness between, and acceptance
from, community members. As a result, the Oneida could utilize these affective and
gemeinschaft orientations towards functional (gesellschaft) ends—the deep feelings
between members, and the social pressure inspired by these feelings could be
harnessed by and institutionalized in the process of mutual criticism to control
deviance and maintain the boundaries of the Oneida community circle. Thus, just as
we will see in the following two examples, a symbiotic relationship existed between
core community values, the gemeinschaft/gesellschaft nature of the community, the
individual desires and needs of members, and the exercise of social control. As the
re-affirming and deviance-controlling nature of mutual criticism guarded against the
gradual erosion of the Oneida’s shared beliefs, the system of mutual criticism itself
could never have succeeded without reliance on those very same values. Likewise,
just as the isolation- and communalism-inspired affective relations between members
made possible a group-oriented process of social control, this social control process
at the same time worked to heighten members’ reliance on and need for social
acceptance. It is in these symbiotic relationships that the circle of the Oneida
Community is drawn, the effect being simultaneously the coalescing of the
community within and the erecting and reinforcing of a barrier without.
B. The Old Order Amish
1. Brief History
The Amish are one of the several direct descendants of the Swiss Anabaptists,
who, along with the followers of Martin Luther, John Calvin and Ulrich Zwingli,
broke from the Roman Catholic Church in the early 16th Century. Considered more
radical than the other reformers of their day, the Anabaptists centered their beliefs
around strong commitment to community, strict adherence to the teachings of Jesus,
and the concept of adult baptism.34 They believed that, according to the bible, since

34

“The term Anabaptist originated as a nickname meaning ‘rebaptizer’.” JOHN A.
HOSTETLER, AMISH SOCIETY 27 (3d ed., The John Hopkins University Press 1980).
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sin only comes with the knowledge of good and evil, then babies, who are without
such knowledge, have no need for the purification of baptism. Thus, the Anabaptists
felt that baptism was more appropriate once a person has matured and become
accountable for his or her own actions.
Divisions soon emerged, however, and around 1536, the Mennonites, under the
leadership of Menno Simons, broke from the rest of the Anabaptists. Nearing the
end of the 17th century, after two-hundred years of agrarian living in the European
valleys of the Jura and Vosges Mountains, a further rift divided the Mennonite
majority from a group that would, behind the divisive presence of Jacob Amman,
become the Amish. The Amish believed that the Mennonites had unacceptably
relaxed many of their practices. The new group advocated semi-annual Communion
(rather than annual), a traditional physical appearance, and restoration of the
Meidung—punishment of religious wrongdoers through excommunication and strict
social avoidance.35
As part of the great waves of Germanic immigration of the 18th and 19th
Centuries, in 1737 the first Amish ship, the Charming Nancy, arrived on the shores
of the new world. This would be only the first of many loads of Amish people
seeking religious tolerance in America during the mid-18th century, and again during
the mid-19th century. These early immigrants settled first in Pennsylvania, but, in
time, expanded westward to Ohio, Indiana, Iowa and elsewhere Though enjoying
the freedoms of the New World, factions among the Amish continued to divide the
population. On three occasions between 1877 and 1966, small groups of Amish,
finding the strictness of Amish life oppressive, sprung out of the traditional Amish
community. The first, the Meetinghouse Amish, eventually folded into the
Mennonite church, while the other two groups, the Peachey (or Beachy) Amish and
the New Order Amish continue today. Thus it is that the traditional Amish, from
which these three groups sprung, have come to be called Old Order (or House)
Amish.36 As of the mid-1980s, there were 175 major Old Order Amish settlements
in North America, home to just over 100,000 Old Order Amish.37 Today’s Old
Order Amish,38 unlike the Oneida Community discussed above, are the possessors of
a long and storied tradition, a fact which, as will be seen below, has significant
effects on the nature and functioning of the community.39

35
Details of the Amish use of the Meidung will be explored in detail further on in this
section.
36
It will be the Old Order Amish, the most traditional of the Amish groups, that will be the
focus of this section. While there are even variations (mainly in custom) among the many Old
Order Amish communities in America, they are similar enough that they may, for the purposes
of this paper, be considered as a single group. More on the organizational factors that allow
such variations within the Old Order Amish will come later in this section.
37

DAVID LUTHY, AMISH SETTLEMENTS ACROSS AMERICA 1-6 (1985); BEN J. RABER, THE
NEW AMERICAN ALMANAC (1986).
38
For the sake of convenience, unless specified, I will refer to the Old Order Amish simply
as “Amish.”
39

For a very helpful timetable of significant events in the history of the Amish, dating back
to A.D. 70. See BERND G. LANGIN, PLAIN AND AMISH 384-89 (1994).
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2. Amish Christianity and Gelassenheit
The Amish version of Christianity, much like the Oneida’s, is one that permeates
every aspect of daily life.40 To the Amish, Christianity is better learned and practiced
through everyday activity and work than it is through textual study. At the heart of
this Amish Christian lifestyle is the notion of Gelassenheit, which, roughly translated
as “submission,” incorporates into the Amish belief system the qualities of
“obedience, humility, submission, thrift and simplicity.”41
Where modern
Christianity is focussed around a church, the Amish have no such place of worship,
instead rotating from home to home for bi-weekly community prayer services.42
Where modern Christian children attend Sunday School, and where modern
Christian leaders are ordained and evaluated on the basis of their knowledge and
scholarship, the Amish frown upon too much knowledge of the scriptures. Likewise,
even the preachers of the community, elected by the community not necessarily on
the basis of their religious scholarship,43 during their sermons tend not to analyze,
rationalize or otherwise interpret the words of the bible. The Amish believe that the
established Christian church has lost its way, and that in isolating themselves from
that mainstream Christianity, it is “[t]he aim of the Amish [ ] to incarnate the
teachings of Jesus into a voluntary social order.”44 As will be seen in the features
considered below, Amish Christianity lies at the very center of what defines the
Amish community.
3. Communalism
The Amish do not live communally. Quite to the contrary, it is the family
structure (in the traditional sense of parents and children) that both socially and
economically binds the Amish together. Traditionally an agrarian people, it is the
ambition of the typical Amish family to own and work its own small farm, husband
and wife saving money from marriage someday to help their children make down
payments on their own farms.45 Yet while the primary group for the Amish is the

40

It is thus vital to realize in considering the nature of the Amish community, that it is
essentially impossible to isolate religion from the rest of Amish life.
41

DONALD B. KRAYBILL, THE RIDDLE OF AMISH CULTURE 25 (1989).

42

It is from this tradition that the name “House Amish” likely arose.

43

“Attending a seminary would be a sure sign of worldliness and reason for
excommunication, for it would indicate a loss of humility and the development of an ego.”
HOSTETLER, supra note 34, at 108.
44

Id. at 77. As a basis for this desire for isolation, the Amish generally point to three
biblical passages: Rom. 12:2 (“Be not conformed to this world, but be ye transformed by the
renewing of your mind that ye may prove what is that good and acceptable and perfect will of
God.”); II Cor. 6:14 (“Be ye not unequally yoked together with unbelievers; for what
fellowship hath righteousness with unrighteousness? What communion hath light with
darkness?”); and 1 Peter 2:9 (“But ye are a chosen generation, a royal priesthood, an holy
nation, a peculiar people.”).
45
Id. at 132. In recent times, due both to modern farming innovations and to serious land
squeezes, some Amish families are having to leave the farming lifestyle. Where possible, they
try to find work in farming-related industries like carpentry. For a discussion of this recent
phenomenon, in reference to a particular Indiana Amish community, see Thomas J. Meyers,

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol49/iss2/5

16

2001]

THE SYMBIOTIC CIRCLE OF COMMUNITY

287

immediate family, a variety of factors contributes to what is, if not a communitywide primary group, at the least a community-wide sense of shared beliefs and
interdependence to a degree rarely seen in modern American society.
Amish communalism, then, is not so much literal communalism, in the sense of
group ownership and group living, but rather a spiritual communalism based in the
spirit of Gelassenheit. There is an understanding among the Amish that the fate of
the community as a whole supercedes individuality or individual ownership. Thus,
while individual families own their own homes and farms, reaping profits to be kept
by those individual family units, the level of sharing and interdependence between
families, as Elmer and Dorothy Swhwieder argue, is such that the Amish may be
called a “semicommunal society.”46 Wherever possible, the Amish form collectives:
from fire insurance47 to medical insurance to bank loans, the community organizes to
divide responsibility among the many families. In a particularly widely reported
series of events, the Amish refused, on the basis of their faith, to pay or receive
social security.48 Arguing that their receipt of social security would create a
dependence on the United States government, an abhorrent result in their eyes, they
sought, and ultimately received, an exemption from the law mandating payments
from self-employed persons.49 This “mutual assistance” also appears informally.
For example, when an Amish farmer desires to build a new building, the community
will come together for a day, for what they term a “frolic”, to construct the building.
Thus, as was the case among the Oneida, though here perhaps to a somewhat lesser
degree, the Amish inject into many of their daily gesellschaft functions (insurance
building construction, etc.) the spirit of gemeinschaft.
The Amish desire for
community independence from external aid, coupled with the difficulties of the
agricultural life (particularly in light of their self-imposed technological restrictions,
discussed below), make this mutual assistance a necessity. Yet, as practically and
functionally necessary as it may be, mutual aid also serves to reinforce a sense of
interdependence and communalism—a sense of gemeinschaft community—among
the Amish.
4. Isolation and The Ordnung
As discussed above, the Amish seek to separate themselves from mainstream
American society. Once, perhaps, the Amish were as physically isolated as were the
Lunch Pails and Factories, in THE AMISH STRUGGLE WITH MODERNITY 165-181 (Donald B.
Kraybill & Marc A. Olshan eds., 1994).
46

DOROTHY SCHWEIDER & ELMER SCHWEIDER, A PECULIAR PEOPLE: IOWA’S OLD ORDER
AMISH 39 (1975).
47
One representative example of an Iowa Amish community’s internal fire insurance
system is described in A Peculiar People. It explains that where a member “loses a farm
building due to fire or windstorm, the farmer suffering the misfortune will pay one-fourth the
cost himself and the remaining three-fourths is divided among” the rest of the community,
each family paying according to its needs, as determined by church leaders. Id. at 40-41.
48

See, e.g., Clarence W. Hall, The Revolt of the Plain People, READER’S DIGEST, Nov.

1962.
49
Before Congressional committees, they cited the Bible as the basis of their refusal: “if
any provide not . . . for those of his own house, he hath denied the faith, and is worse than an
infidel.” 1 Tim. 5:8.
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Oneida Community. But with their own increased numbers, and the shrinking of
farmland across America generally, it is one of the Amish’s great struggles with
modernity to maintain this sense of separateness from the growing levels of intrusion
from the outside world.50 Thus, in recent times, where it is not uncommon for Amish
families to have non-Amish neighbors living right next door, Amish separateness
must be reinforced in other ways. For this, the Amish have the Ordnung. In part
deriving from centuries-old tradition, and in part the result of semi-annual meetings
of local church leaders, the Ordnung are the rules by which Amish life is defined and
by which Amish identity is formed and reinforced. In so doing, it serves as the basis
for Amish separateness and isolation.
As mentioned briefly above, the Amish are practitioners of adult baptism. Prior
to baptism (which usually takes place between sixteen and twenty-one years of age),
a young Amish person is not technically responsible for following the Ordnung. It is
not until baptism, the moment at which the member voluntarily decides51 to become
a full adult member of the church, that he or she must, in the eyes of the church and
the community, rigorously follow the rules of the church district. This fact has

50

For more on the effects of modernity on the Amish lifestyle and economic pursuits,
much is provided in DONALD B. KRAYBILL & STEVEN M. NOLT, AMISH ENTERPRISE (1995);
and in KRAYBILL & OLSHAN, supra note 45.
51
I would like again to consider, much as I did in discussing the Oneida above, the reality
of a young Amish person’s ability to choose not to take baptism—to decide not to become a
full member of the church. Prior to baptism, because the young Amish are not literally
required by the church to follow the rules of the Ordnung, the responsibility of keeping the
youths in line falls on parents. From early childhood, Amish children are made aware of their
distinctiveness, and are raised so carefully within an insular Amish world that they generally
do not feel comfortable outside of it. They wear distinctive Amish clothing, learn to speak
German, and attend Amish schools. In other words, through the maintenance of a strict Amish
upbringing, the Amish community creates for its youths an affective and instrumental
dependence and a moral provincialism that in many instances constructs a virtually
insurmountable obstacle to an individual member’s efforts to exit the community. Thus, even
though pre-baptism Amish youths are given somewhat more latitude than full adult members
(for exactly the purpose of informing their upcoming baptism decision through experiencing a
taste of the outside world), only a small percentage of Amish youths choose not to be baptized
into the adult membership. Interestingly, it seems that the more liberal Amish communities
(the New Order Amish, the Beachy Amish and the like), whose youths tend to gain somewhat
more experience with the outside world, have on average a much lower retention rate. In one
Ohio county, for example, the most traditional Amish communities retain around 90 percent of
their youths, where the least traditional Amish groups baptize less than 60 percent. See
KRAYBILL & OLSHAN, supra note 45, at 73.
Whether these retention rates evidence the greater appeal of increasingly strict Amish life,
or the effects of a dangerously isolated and regimented childhood has long been discussed.
Much of the debate since the Supreme Court case of Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972),
(exempting Amish children from mandatory schooling until the age of sixteen) involved the
issue of Amish children’s rights to make their own life choices. Many argued that, because of
the insulated nature of an Amish upbringing (made increasingly insular by the Court’s
decision in Yoder), Amish children are effectively precluded from making their own voluntary
decisions whether to remain within the Amish community or to leave it. This issue will be
reconsidered in Section IV.
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significant implications in regard to excommunication and shunning, discussed
below, in connection with transgressions of the Ordnung.52
Because much of the Ordnung is not based on tradition, but rather on the semiyearly decisions of each community’s leaders, there is invariably some variation in
custom from one Amish community to another. However, as one scholar familiar
with the Amish explains, it is not so much the particular customs that are of utmost
significance, but rather the effect of these customs in separating the Amish from the
rest of the world.
To be separate from the world is to be different from the world. Being
different is more important, within limits, than specific ways of being
different....The strong commitment to the principle of separation from the
world also helps to explain why the Amish are not disturbed by slightly
different rules in other Amish communities.53
For the most part, however, the Ordnung remains fairly constant from one
community to another. Long hair, dark, formal clothes, shaven mustaches with long
beards for married men, no automobiles, no central heating or electricity, the use of
horses, limited formal education and the use of German dialect tend to be the most
universal and outwardly observable tenets of the Ordnung. It is precisely because of
the outward perceptibility of these features that they are practiced by the Amish: to
look different is to be different. Also, with proscriptions on automobiles, televisions
and the like, the Amish not only look to separate others from them, but also to isolate
themselves from others. Thus, the Ordnung serves three related functions: first, to
forge identity by visibly distinguishing the Amish from their mainstream neighbors;
second, to form and reinforce a common lifestyle by which to unify the members of
a given Amish community; and third, whether intentional or not, to create the types
of strong affective, instrumental, and moral isolation to serve as a barrier to
membership secession.
5. Organizational Structure
Amish communities may be found in twenty-three different states or provinces
across North America.54 Yet, with the exception of relatively recent and issuespecific organizations and committees, they have few organizational structures
extending beyond the individual church district level. A typical church district, the
basic social unit beyond the individual family, is generally comprised of about
twenty extended family units (around 165 people), living in close distance to each
other.55 Because of high rates of intermarriage, many members of a single district
will have the same last name, often with four or five names accounting for nearly

52
For an account of the standard Amish baptismal service, see HOSTETLER, supra note 32,
at 81-83.
53

Id. at 85.

54

For a listing of each settlement, including the date founded and the number of
congregations per settlement, see David Luthy, Amish Migration Patterns: 1972-1992, in THE
AMISH STRUGGLE WITH MODERNITY (Donald B. Kraybill & Marc A. Olsham eds., 1994).
55

KRAYBILL, supra note 41, at 76.
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three-fourths of the district population.56 The church district is the central unit
around which Amish social, religious and economic life revolves.
As the central community unit, each church district has its own leadership,
consisting of three positions: a bishop (though sometimes a bishop will preside over
two districts), two or three preachers, and a deacon. Each position has its own roles
and responsibilities, usually extending from the religious nature to the social to the
political. At the head of this structure presides the bishop, the spiritual head of the
community. It is his job to interpret local regulations and to make decisions
regarding deviant behavior. Beneath the bishop, the preachers, sometimes called
ministers, are responsible for giving the sermons during the bi-weekly worship
services. Finally, it is the deacon’s job to lead prayers during worship services and
to assist the needy of the community. Though these are the general duties of the three
positions, they often overlap with each other and also expand into other areas of life.
As one scholar explained, quite generally, “The bishop, minister, and deacon form an
informal ‘executive committee’ that guides and coordinates the activities of the local
district.”57
Though an organizational body consisting of only four or five members may
seem like a rather centralized model, several contributing factors reveal that the
Amish posses within this structure a strong sense of egalitarian democratic
participation. First, in a manner reminiscent of the Oneidan decision-making
process, though the leaders of the community often give advice and make
recommendations on major community decisions, technically, the decisions are not
made without a vote of all adult members of the church district. With this in mind,
Hostetler has labeled the Amish organizational/decision-making system a
“patriarchal democracy.”58
The second insight into the Amish organizational structure comes with an
understanding of the process of selecting these leaders. With the exception of the
bishop, who must first serve in one of the lesser positions before rising to bishop, the
district leaders are selected on the combined basis of democratic choice and divine
intervention. When a position opens up (which is rare, since leadership positions are
for life), each adult district member casts a nomination, whispering to the bishop
through a nearly closed door the name of a fellow-member who would be fit for the
task. When all the nominees have been selected, a stack of bibles is piled before
them, one bible for each nominee. Each nominee in turn chooses one bible from the
collection, in one of which has secretly been placed a piece of paper containing a
biblical passage. The one who chooses the bible with the extra piece of paper has
been “struck,” and has thus been chosen in accordance with God’s will to help lead
the community. In this manner, much as John Humphrey Noyes’s divine status lent
a spiritual weight to his words and decisions, by allowing God’s will to make the
final selection for district leaders, the Amish may also rely on those leaders’
decisions as being, to a degree, the will of God. It is with this combination of
egalitarian democracy and religious faith, based on the spirit of Gelassenheit, that

56

Id. at 77.

57

Id. at 80.

58

HOSTETLER, supra note 34, at 111.
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decisions are made and shared values and social norms are determined, reified, and
enforced.
6. The Meidung
As mentioned above, at the heart of the Amish split from the Mennonites around
1700 was the controversy over the Meidung. To this day, where Mennonite
communities do not strictly enforce the Meidung (“the shunning or avoiding of
excommunicated members”),59 for the Amish, it is perhaps the central element of
social control.60 With scriptural bases in 1 Cor. 5:9-11, Rom. 16:17, 2 Thess.
3:14,15, and Titus 3:10,11, the Meidung serves numerous purposes, from punishing
the transgressor, to attempting to coax the transgressor towards mending his ways, to
protecting the rest of the community from impure elements. One insight into the
reasoning behind the Meidung, as explained by Amish leaders themselves, states as
follows:
If anyone whether it be through a wicked life or perverse doctrine
is...expelled from the church he must also according to the doctrine of
Christ and his apostles, be shunned and avoided by all the members of the
church.... In short that we are to have nothing to do with him; so that we
may not become defiled by intercourse with him and partakers of his sins,
but that he may be made ashamed, be affected in his mind, convinced in
his conscience and thereby induced to amend his ways.61
Though fear of the Meidung looms over all facets of Amish life, its actual
application Meidung is considered a last resort. Where a transgressor of the
Ordnung has been identified, generally, the first step is an informal one: gossip
within the community and the like. Where this shows no effect, the church leaders
will tend to intervene, either in the form of a visit to the transgressor by the bishop or
preacher, or else a request for the transgressor to appear before the congregation to
confess his or her errant behavior and ask forgiveness. Where necessary, however, if
no apology or improvement in behavior is made, the final step is the imposition of
the Meidung. Because of the seriousness of this last resort, though the bishop is the
one formally responsible for imposing the Meidung, it generally will not be imposed
without the near consensus of the entire church district. Once the punishment has
been imposed, however, it is total. The shunned member may not eat at the same
table as his family, and must sleep in a separate bed or room. If he or she is married,
marital relations will be terminated. Generally, church members are persuaded to
have as little contact as possible with the shunned member. The Meidung will
extend not only to the members of the church district (who, if they ignore the
Meidung, will themselves receive the same punishment), but also to all other Amish
communities. The Meidung, then, is not only aimed at the transgressor (either as
punishment or as an incentive to reform), but may also be considered a command to
the community in general, serving the multiple purposes of (1) setting an example of
59

KEPHART, supra note 8, at 49.

60

Recall that because Amish people who have yet to be baptized are not required by the
church to follow the rules of the Ordnung, they are likewise not subject to the imposition of
the Meidung.
61

KRAYBILL, supra note 41, at 116 (citing The Dordrecht Confession of Faith).
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what happens to transgressors, (2) protecting the community from unwanted
influences, and (3) reinforcing the acceptable boundaries of behavior.
From the perspective of the shunned member, however, the imposition of the
Meidung is a harsh reality. Because of the Amish community’s high degree of
isolation from mainstream society, a shunned member is not only suddenly without
the constant contact and affection of his friends and family, but is also left in a very
unfamiliar world. It is a limbo state between, on one side, his or her family and
community, who are forbidden from interacting with him or her, and on the other
side the outside world, with which the shunned member has likely had extremely
little contact. Furthermore, a newly shunned member realizes that a move towards
mainstream society will only alienate him or her further from the Amish community.
It is this sense of limbo that makes the Meidung, and perhaps even more
significantly, the very threat of the Meidung, so effective.
Though the Meidung is imposed for life, it may be revoked upon the public
admission and apology of the shunned member. And, as one writer explains, the pull
of desire for renewed acceptance by the community tends to be quite effective in
eliciting such an apology: “Following the pronouncement of shunning, the religious
leaders continue their efforts to persuade the sinful member to repent and again enter
into full fellowship with the group. Faced with loss of contact with friends and
family as well as the immense family suffering, the errant member will usually
quickly repent.”62 Yet, Amish leaders are aware that the Meidung is not imposed
solely with the individual transgressor in mind—it has also been imposed for the
protection of the whole community from the contaminating effects of “un-Amish
behavior.” Premature re-acceptance of the shunned member may jeopardize the
whole community if his or her behavior has not truly been modified. Church leaders
must therefore walk a fine line between, among other considerations, their desire to
help the shunned member mend his or her ways, and their responsibility to protect
the community from further corruption.63
7. Summary
Having survived and prospered in America for more than 250 years, the Old
Order Amish are a shining example of resilience. Though their culture has surely
evolved since the 18th Century, the ability of the Amish over the years to maintain a
powerful sense of community and an equally strong sense of separateness from the
rest of society, is remarkable. In comparing the Amish to the other two communities
in this Section, six features stand out as particularly significant. First, unlike the
Oneida, the Amish have a long and well-documented history. In their ability to point
to generations of blood descendants in whose path they follow, and the hardships
that those generations faced, the Amish gain a potent tool in encouraging a sense of
tradition and a shared desire to perpetuate it. Second, the spirit of Gelassenheit, at
the core of Amish beliefs, feeds not only obedience to current community norms but
also the humility and submission beneficial to maintaining order and social control
62

SCHWEIDER & SCHWEIDER, supra note 46, at 67.
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For a description of the procedure for readmitting shunned members back into the
community following their public admission and apology, see Joseph Unzicker, Restoring A
Fallen Member, in AMISH ROOTS: A TREASURY OF HISTORY, WISDOM, AND LORE 92-93 (John
A. Hostetler ed., 1989).
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over time. Third, the Amish variation on communalism, the formal and informal
mutual assistance of “semi-communalism,” serves the dual role of perpetuating the
economic health of the community and of forging a sense of collective responsibility,
interdependence and shared fate. Fourth, though not as physically isolated as the
Oneida, the strict rules of the Ordnung and the visibly distinctive lifestyle mandated
by it, nonetheless successfully isolate the Amish from their mainstream neighbors.
Fifth, the organizational and decision-making structure of the Amish church districts
creates a strong sense of participation. A small, essentially self-sufficient and
autonomous social unit, with leaders determined by both popularly and divinely
selected forces, the church district creates an atmosphere of “patriarchal democracy”
that instills in its lay members a strong sense of involvement in the community.
Just as was seen with the Oneida, the combination of the above characteristics
makes social pressure a particularly potent force. Yet, perhaps because of the
relatively greater emphasis among the Amish on family as the primary group, or
because of the humility and submission of Gelassenheit, or the weaker emphasis
placed on individual perfection, mutual criticism is not to be found among the
Amish. It is instead the fear of the Meidung—of being excluded from the
particularities and closeness of the community and cast out into an unfamiliar
world—that works to control deviant behavior. Thus, just as mutual criticism
worked symbiotically with the characteristics of Oneida life, so too does the
Meidung rely on, and at the same time perpetuate, the shared norms and beliefs of
the Amish. Without the intense isolation, the strong sense of tradition, the
submission of Gelassenheit, and the rest of the characteristics that together comprise
Amish-ness, the Meidung would be nothing more than the common occurrence to
which mainstream Americans benignly refer as “leaving the nest.” The Meidung
fortifies the circumference around the Amish circle of community.
C. Conclusions
From an examination of these two examples of community, we can make several
observations and glean a number of important lessons. We see that strong
orientations towards affectivity and moral cohesion, coupled with predominantly
gemeinschaftian functions, creates a climate of heightened social pressure. Among
both the Amish and the Oneida, members held cohesive and clear understandings of
what was “right” or “wrong” behavior. In the form both of clear religious and moral
bases of belief and of structured and systematic programs of communalism, civic
participation, and physical and symbolic isolation from the outside world, the Amish
and Oneida constantly reinforced group norms of belief and behavior. Further,
community members were able to impose these collective norms on potential
deviants, because of the intense affectivity felt between members. Humility and a
group-first mentality were emphasized in both these communities, intensifying the
power of criticism from the community, and to a degree deflating any potential for
discussion of individual substantive or procedural rights. It might thus be said that
the strong interconnectedness among members, and the cohesiveness of beliefs and
norms enabled these communities to infuse into their gesellschaft functions (in
particular that of social control) the benefits of gemeinschaft relations.
Adding to the internal authority of this informal social control, the intense
isolation of these communities likely made ties between members and general
acceptance from the community seem, to the individual member, all the more a
necessity for survival. Interpersonal ties to the outside world were few; educational

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2001

23

294

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49:271

instruction on the skills needed to survive in the outside world were scarce; and the
moral and religious teachings of the community painted a picture of the outside
world as a dangerous and troubled place. In envisioning the circles of community
proposed at the beginning of this paper, where there were few (or perhaps none)
other circles overlapping these communities, the transition from one circle to anther
(as the result of significant deviation from group norms) is a seemingly
insurmountable obstacle. Accordingly, not only was the potency of social pressure a
product of deep internal ties, but it was also a result of the fact that barriers to exit
(both affective, instrumental and moral) were rigorous, and thus the risks of
deviance—complete alienation and isolation from one’s community—were
incredibly severe.64 In the most simple terms, we see, again, that there is a symbiotic
relationship at work within each of the Section I communities, between the core
values, goals and general natures of those communities and their respective social
control functions.
III. SECTION II.
A. Residential Community Associations
More than 205,000 Residential Community Associations (RCAs) throughout the
United States are home to over 42 million Americans, representing 15% of all
housing nationwide.65 Thus, unlike with the other communities considered above, it
would be ridiculous to discuss all RCAs as a single community. In this section, I
will look at the “RCA movement” in generalized terms, drawing on secondary
sources which have in the same manner examined the most common features of the
many RCAs. Though the picture of RCAs will not emerge as clearly as the other,
more specific (and smaller) communities considered above, it is my hope that this
section will provide at least some understanding of why people have chosen to create
and live in RCAs, the nature of “community” within RCAs, the organizational
structures of those associations, and the manner in which deviant behavior is
controlled. In other words, it is my goal to consider the RCA movement from the
same perspective and with the same format as I have previously considered the other
communities above. This will, I hope, provide an interesting basis by which to
compare extremely different types of communities, and the relationships within each
of those communities between shared beliefs, values and behavioral norms and the
mechanisms by which they are controlled, reinforced and perpetuated by the
community.

64
We will return for further discussion of the significance of individual member’s barriers
to exit in Section IV.
65

This figure was provided by the Community Associations Institute, a national nonprofit
organization created to provide guidance and educational and training services to RCA
memberships and management. To find out more, see http://www.caionline.org (last visited
April 2001).
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1. Definition and Brief History
66

Though RCAs take numerous forms, in most basic terms they may all as a
group be defined as mandatory membership organizations, entered into by covenant
in conjunction with deed of ownership, which require dues assessments from its
members in return for providing a wide array of services and shared facilities. They
may vary in size from fewer than ten residents to as many as 68,000, with
organizational structures of correspondingly varying sizes.
They may be
“territorial,” with numerous individual buildings on a common site, some owned
individually by members, some owned by the association; or they may be contained
within a single hi-rise building, with each member owning individually the interior
space of a given apartment unit, and sharing in the ownership of the common areas.67
A third, though far less common type of legal structure is the cooperative, in which
individual members do not own units outright, but rather all own shares in the entire
building, and as a result of share-ownership gain rights to particular units.
Regardless of legal format, when an individual purchases a unit within an RCA, he
or she becomes contractually bound by that Association’s conditions, covenants, and
restrictions (“CC&R’s”), which much like a city’s local ordinances (or in a sense like
the Amish Ordnung), govern life within the Community.68
It is likely that the broad conception at the heart of the RCA—a blend of
individual home ownership and shared use of common spaces—dates back to the

66
Other commonly used names for RCAs include: residential associations, homeowners’
associations, property owners’ associations, planned communities, condominium associations,
common interest associations, cooperatives, or councils of co-owners.
67

For the purposes of this paper, there is no great need to get into the details of the various
possible legal forms of RCAs. Most basically, RCAs blend individual unit ownership with
shared ownership of or responsibility for common areas and shared facilities. Thus, when a
person purchases a unit, be it a stand-alone house within a “territorial” association or a
condominium apartment unit, he or she will also, as a mandatory effect of purchase, by
covenant enter into the Association. In so doing, that individual will gain the benefit of
common facilities and services,—generally, either (1) as with condominiums, through
contractual common interest ownership (of the property directly, where unincorporated, or
indirectly, as a shareholder, where incorporated), or else (2) where the Association itself owns
the common areas, through contractual membership assessment fees. For a more detailed
account of the various legal structures of RCAs, see, WAYNE S. HYATT & SUSAN F. FRENCH,
COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION LAW (1998).
68

This comparison between RCAs and cities is perhaps the most controversial and widely
debated issue in the field. Its ramifications, from Due Process issues to Equal Protection
issues, to §1983 liability issues, are huge. Though in this section I will discuss some of the
public functions served by RCAs, I will not directly address the public-private distinction. For
one source providing a nice survey of the debate, see Harvey Rishikof & Alexander Wohl,
Private Communities or Public Governments: ‘The State Will Make the Call’, 30 VAL. U. L.
REV. 509 (1996). For a second, much shorter article, covering the major theories of publicprivate distinction, and the consequences of finding RCAs private, see Katherine Rosenberry,
Condominium and Homeowner Associations: Should They Be Treated Like ‘MiniGovernments?,’ in RESIDENTIAL COMMUNITY ASSOCIATIONS: PRIVATE GOVERNMENTS IN THE
INTERGOVERNMENTAL SYSTEM (U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations
ed., 1989).
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earliest of civilizations.69 But according to at least one expert in the RCA field, the
modern conception got its start in 1808, with the creation by covenant upon the
conveyance of land, a mandate specifically designating property in Leicester Square,
in London, England to remain as a garden to be freely enjoyed by adjoining tenants.
With the Court’s decision in Tulk v. Moxhay 41 Eng. Rep. 1143 (Ch. 1848) to
enforce the covenanted restriction (on grounds that the purchaser was aware of the
restriction), the notion of equitable servitudes was born, and with it the concept of
insuring future property-sharing through the use of such restricting covenants.
In time, the notion of restrictive covenants made its way across the Atlantic,
finding open arms at the turn of the 20th Century in the form of upper-class
communities seeking legal teeth for their exclusionary desires.70 With the New Deal,
the birth of the Federal Housing Commission, and the post-war baby boom,
subdivisions with restrictive covenants in their deeds began to proliferate, and at the
same time the popularity of the condominium grew enormously.71 Yet, even by
1960, fewer than one thousand Associations existed nationwide, and most were still
single-family unit Associations “in relatively exclusive neighborhoods.”72 With
increases in property costs during the 1960s, though, developers began to have
difficulty finding buyers for their large lot single-family homes. At the same time,
local governments, facing budget crunches, were seeking ways of reducing their own
responsibility in providing services to their citizens. In reaction to these concurrent
trends, developers began to subdivide the large lots, building smaller, less expensive
houses with relaxed use restrictions (known as Planned Use Developments, or
PUDs), and providing formerly-government-provided services through the inception
of RCAs.73 At the same time, also on the basis of their inexpensiveness and
convenience, condominium sales were skyrocketing as well. By the end of the
1970s, there were 186,000 condominium starts each year, accounting for 14% of all
annual housing starts.74 In all, about half of all new homes currently built in the
United States are in RCAs.75
Through the 1980s, RCAs grew both in number and in variety. No longer were
they solely enclaves for the rich or resort communities for the elderly. They now
spanned in scope from a few homes on a privatized street to medium-sized cities like
Reston, Virginia and Columbia, Maryland. With the dramatic increase in variety, it

69
For example, Edward J. Blakely and Mary Gail Snyder discuss one of the early examples
of a gated community: “In England the earliest gated communities were build by the
occupying Romans around 300 B.C. Roman soldiers were given land and estates in tribal
areas after their term of service in the army.... Roman families clustered near or within the
manor precinct and erected walls....” EDWARD J. BLAKELY & MARY GAIL SNYDER, FORTRESS
AMERICA: GATED COMMUNITIES IN THE UNITED STATES (1997).
70

EVAN MCKENZIE, PRIVATOPIA (1994).

71

See generally id. at ch. 2; HYATT & FRENCH, supra note 67, at 19-22.

72

ROBERT JAY DILGER, NEIGHBORHOOD POLITICS: RESIDENTIAL COMMUNITY ASSOCIATIONS
IN AMERICAN GOVERNANCE 49 (1992).
73

Id. at 50.
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JAMES DOWDEN, COMMUNITY ASSOCIATIONS: A GUIDE FOR PUBLIC OFFICIALS (1980).
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See http://www.caionline.org (last visited April 2001).
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is consequently increasingly difficult to provide a single definition for an RCA or to
discuss the “nature” or “structure” or “mechanisms of social control” of RCAs
generally. Accordingly, I again encourage the reader, in considering the aspects of
RCAs discussed below, to be mindful of the fact that they are being presented as
generalized conceptions of this large-scale movement. While there will no doubt be
exceptions to nearly every generalization, I remain hopeful that such a general
discussion will nonetheless provide some utility in providing a sense of the circle of
community captured by RCAs.
2. Community Beliefs or Shared Goals?
So what is it that unites people, either to create an RCA or to move to one? What
puts the “community” in “residential community association”? To varying degrees,
those who have studied the RCA movement over the years tend to focus on the
following aspects: cost-effective services,76 safety,77 a sense of community inspired
by the shared use of such facilities as swimming pools and golf courses,78 increased
participation in local decision-making,79 the aesthetic continuity and regulation of
use restrictions,80 and the security in future property values felt to be insured by these
factors.81 (Interestingly, the RCAs themselves tend to emphasize some of these
features more—or at least more explicitly—than others.82) However, at the risk of
redundancy, RCAs are a far more difficult “community” to pinpoint than the
76
See, e.g., Ronald J. Oakerson, Private Street Associations in St. Louis County:
Subdivisions as Service Providers, in RESIDENTIAL COMMUNITY ASSOCIATIONS: PRIVATE
GOVERNMENTS IN THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL SYSTEM (U.S. Advisory Commission on
Intergovernmental Relations ed., 1989) (considering the effectiveness of a street privatization
scheme, which, dating back to the mid-19th Century, which provides for subdivisions as small
as just several houses along a single street, together having contracted for their own service
provision).
77

For a somewhat tongue-in-cheek discussion of the safety benefits of RCAs, in particular
gated communities, see BLAKELY & SNYDER, supra note 69, at 18, 99-124. The authors also
note that “[a] 1990 survey of southern California home shoppers found that 54 percent wanted
a gated, walled development....” Id. at 7. Though this is not necessarily an indication that
these home shoppers wanted to live in walled developments for the sake of improved safety,
common sense suggests that for most of these shoppers, safety must have been at least a
strongly contributing factor to this preference.
78
See, e.g., CARL NORCROSS, TOWNHOUSES & CONDOMINIUMS: RESIDENTS’ LIKES
DISLIKES (1973).

AND

79
See, e.g., Clayton P. Gillette, Courts, Covenants, and Communities, 61 U. CHI. L. REV.
1375 (1994) (considering the benefits of RCAs, highlights their ability to increase resident
input in the community decision-making and community character-determining processes).
80

See http://www.caionline.org/about/explanation.cfm (last visited April 2001).

81

“Preservation of property values is the highest social goal [within RCAs], to which other
aspects of community life are subordinated.” MCKENZIE, supra note 70, at 19.
82
It is interesting in this regard to explore various RCA web sites. Though I have not
conducted an exhaustive study, it appears they attempt to emphasize both these types of
relations. If interested in exploring these sites, a helpful place to start is at the Community
Associations Institute web site, which includes a series of links to all its members’ sites, at
http://www.caionline.org/about/hoalinks.cfm (last visited April 2001).

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2001

27

298

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49:271

communities in Section I. From one Association to another, as the size, shape,
location and populations change dramatically, so too will the degrees to which each
of these features is emphasized, promoted, perceived, or achieved. Thus, we may
consider this list neither as exhaustive of all desirable attributes of RCAs generally,
nor as necessary features of a given RCA. Instead, let it serve as a loose, informal,
generalized list of the purposes—what we might lump together as “shared values and
goals”— behind many RCAs.83
Keeping the above list of “shared values and goals” in mind, perhaps the most
significant, and surely the most universal, of all attributes of RCAs generally is that
membership is of a contractual nature. Unlike a person’s submission to local
government, which will necessarily occur, to one local government or another,
submission to (i.e. the decision to live in) a RCA is strictly voluntary.84 In even
83
Much has been made in comparing these incentives, these “shared values and goals”, to
those of the sorts of communities in Section I. Many such comparisons turn on the
gemeinschaft/gesellschaft and instrumental/affective/moral distinctions described above.
Some scholars of RCAs focus on the relative lack of affective, interpersonal relations or
gemeinschaft functions, emphasizing instead their gesellschaftian and instrumental contractual
basis and service-supply focus. Others, however, consider this one-sided approach overstated.
They point out the potential gemeinschaft and affective qualities that within an RCA can forge
strong interpersonal bonds. See, e.g., Gregory S. Alexander, Dilemmas of Group Autonomy:
Residential Associations and Community, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 39-43 (1989) (advocating a
combination approach to understanding RCAs, pointing out that while they may be
contractually created, an analysis of them based solely on a contractarian, public choice
perspective ignores the interpersonal, gemeinschaftian insights often attributed to the
Communitarian school).
In considering the features of RCA life below, it might be useful to keep in mind the
following questions. Do RCAs, as many critics contend, have a relatively stronger focus on
gesellschaft relations, rather than gemeinschaft relations, than the communities in Section I?
As compared to cities generally? Do the potential members of RCAs put more emphasis in
their decision-making process on instrumental, rather than affective or moral incentives? I
have no intent to argue that one type of relations, or one kind of group orientation, makes for a
stronger, better, or more just community than others. Rather, I hope only to illuminate the
differences between RCAs and the communities in Part I.
84

For a fascinating debate on the relative voluntariness of RCA and city membership
between two of the foremost legal scholars in the field of local government and RCAs, see
Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1059 (1980); and Robert C.
Ellickson, Cities and Homeowners Associations, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1519 (1982), as well as
the Comments and Replies which follow. Additionally, James L. Winokur argues that
voluntariness in RCAs is limited by the fact that oftentimes purchasers are not fully aware of
the restrictions and obligations that come with membership. He writes: “Purchasers of
servitude regime properties are often oblivious to applicable servitude documents, which in
many states need not be called to a purchaser’s attention or even be recorded in order to
remain binding. Servitude documentation is long, technical, boring reading for lay persons,
who rarely retain attorneys to review home purchase documents.” James L. Winokur,
Association-Administered Servitude Regimes: A Private Property Perspective, in RESIDENTIAL
COMMUNITY ASSOCIATIONS: PRIVATE GOVERNMENTS IN THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL SYSTEM 85,
87 (U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations ed., 1989). The large number
of legal disputes over the enforcement of these servitudes, an issue discussed later in this
section, is perhaps an indication of the validity and significance of this argument. Finally,
Robert Jay Dilger argues that because, “in many areas of the country RCAs now dominate the
local housing market and are increasingly offering fairly uniform levels and types of services,”
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starker contrast, and directly related to the comparative purpose of this paper, unlike
the informal submission to the authority of a community like those in Section I,
membership in an RCA—along with the rights and responsibilities of membership—
is documented and memorialized in writing. It is this writing, this enumeration of
“can’s” and “cannot’s”, this balancing of rights between the association and the
individual, as memorialized in the governing documents, that distinguishes the RCA
from the Section I communities. As I intend to make clearer throughout this Section,
the “shared values and goals” that help to define the RCAs may be termed as
follows: a cooperative but rights-protective pursuit of individual, instrumental goals.
3. Communalism
The communities of Section I shared some aspect of communalism. Though the
Oneida was more literally formal than the Amish, in the sense of strictly shared
possessions, they both present what might be considered a broader sense of
“communalism,” in their feelings of interconnectedness and interdependence among
members. It was in part this communalism that allowed the Section I communities to
merge gemeinschaft and gesellschaft functions, such that even the most menial and
necessary of tasks worked to increase and strengthen interpersonal ties among
members. RCAs present a different version of communalism—one that is in some
sense more literally communal than, for example, Amish communalism (e.g. the
possibility of shared ownership); but also one that is generally quite limited—
arguably an interdependence or interconnectedness that extends no further than
would be found outside the RCAs in mainstream America.
The basis of RCA communalism—in the very literal meaning of the word—lies
in the sharing of facilities and services. As discussed above, RCAs come in a variety
of forms, shapes, and sizes. One commonality, though, regardless of the legal
structure of the Association, is that, in addition to the ownership of an individual
residential unit, members gain access to, and therefore pay assessment fees for,
common facilities and services.85 The extent and range of provided common
facilities and services varies greatly from one RCA to another.86 Also, RCAs’
CC&Rs generally provide a quite rigorous set of rules and regulations, covering
everything from guidelines for use of common areas, to mandatory external design
consumer choice does not really benefit from the proliferation of RCAs as much as it may
seem in the abstract. DILGER, supra note 72, at 38.
85
Recall that under certain legal structures the common areas, and similarly the
responsibilities and liabilities of shared services, are owned jointly in common interest by all
members. In other legal structures, the Association itself owns the common areas with
members contractually responsible for paying dues to the Association for upkeep.
86
For example, in a 1989 joint U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental
Relations-Community Association Institute study of 422 CAI-member RCAs nationwide, 16
percent of respondents reported providing a lake or beach; 33 percent provide “play areas/tot
lots;” 59 percent provide sidewalks; 67 percent provide a swimming pool; 45 percent provide
tennis courts; 38 percent provide an indoor community center; and 37 percent have gates or
fences. As for services, aside for the maintenance of the above indicated shared facilities, 72
percent provide trash collection; 48 provide snow removal; 31 percent provide security patrol;
and 65 provide street repair. RCA Characteristics and Issues, in RESIDENTIAL COMMUNITY
ASSOCIATIONS: PRIVATE GOVERNMENTS IN THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL SYSTEM 9, 13 (U.S.
Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations ed., 1989).
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features of individual residencies. Not only does this likely inspire a sense of shared
lifestyle that might be considered a “communal feeling,” but it is also an indication
of the shared sense of importance placed on property value maintenance.87 Finally,
as will be discussed below, increased resident participation in decision-making is
often offered as a perk of RCA life.88 In all of these ways, then, a sense of
interdependence, if not “communalism,” may generally be perceived in RCAs.
In understanding this list of communal features, however, what stands out is not
so much those features that are included, but rather those that are seen in the Section
I communities but are not apparent in RCAs. There is no ambition within RCAs to
promote Association-wide primary groups.89 Similarly, the mutual assistance of the
Amish is nowhere discussed in the literature on RCAs. Where the communalism of
the Section I communities inspired an infusion of gemeinschaft relations and
affectivity into day to day menial tasks, the type of communalism of RCAs seems
more strictly gesellschaftian in nature, and more akin to Kanter’s description of
instrumental goals. Individuals choose to become members, to become contractually
interconnected to each other, for individual gains—to live in a safer environment, to
live near a golf course, to maintain stable property values, etc. Likewise, the civic
virtue of Association direct democracy seems instrumental as well, to be construed
not so much as an opportunity to determine what is best for the community as a
community, but rather what is best for the community, to be divided among and
enjoyed by individual members.90 Thus, as considered above in regard to the
contractual nature of Association membership, the communalism of RCAs tends to
be as, if not more, concerned with the individual benefits of cooperation and group
living (the instrumental benefits of communal life), than it is with the more
traditional sense of communalism found in the communities of Section I.

87
One of RCA’s major functions “is to protect the neighborhood’s aesthetic and real estate
values by enforcing the covenants, conditions, and restrictions (CC&Rs) that are attached to
each home’s deed.” DILGER, supra note 72, at 23.
88

“As one of the leading advocates of RCAs has argued, unlike local governments, RCAs
provide citizens an opportunity to participate directly, at a more manageable scale, in the
governance of their local neighborhood and community.” Id. at 132.
89

Granted, the level of interpersonal interaction that is likely heightened by the presence of
common facilities and the “direct democracy” of Association governance potentially increases
the bonds between members. However, private ownership of residential units, the contractual
basis of membership, and the limited isolation from the rest of society, to be considered later
in this section, reveal that this interpersonal connectedness extends only so far.
90
This is not to ignore the fact that members of the Section I communities, in deciding
whether to join or to leave the community, likely made their decisions in part based on
instrumental considerations. Indeed, Kanter’s work, emphasizing the existence of all three
orientations, was based in large part on the Oneida Community. Rather, it is to point out, as
was done earlier in this section, that there seems to be a somewhat more instrumentalismheavy balance of considerations in RCAs (as can be seen, I argue, in the RCA version of
communalism) than was seen to be the case in the communities of Section I. This argument
will be fortified, I hope, throughout the remainder of this Section.
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4. Isolation
As discussed briefly above, RCAs take numerous forms, and are found in all
sorts of locations across the country. Some RCAs are “gated communities”, with
actual, physical barriers isolating their residents from the outside world.91 Others,
though not literally gated, are nonetheless physically isolated from the outside world,
either by design (high-rise condominiums, for example92), or location.93 Others still,
particularly where the Association is retrofitted into a more urban area (created after
the residential structures and streets have already been built), construct barricades or
guard posts at the points where privatized Association roads meet the busier nonAssociation streets.94 Some, like Columbia, Maryland or Reston, Virginia, are so
large95 that average passers-by may have no idea they were in an RCA at all.
Regardless of the form or layout of a given RCA, what is certain is that it was
intentionally created, with the goal of separating itself, for any or all of a vast
number of possible reasons, from others. In this sense, they all may be considered,
in some way, and to varying degrees, isolationist.
For those RCAs without physical barriers, isolation is often achieved in other
ways. In a manner similar to the Ordnung’s isolating affect among the Amish, the
aesthetic, use, and behavior restrictions of Association CC&Rs have what might be
similarly experienced as an isolating effect. In many RCAs, for example, residential
units are limited to a very small number of possible styles, colors and other such
features, making clear the transition from the outside world to Association property.
Among those RCAs that were planned prior to building (in contrast to those
Associations established among already built units), street designs can have a strong
91

A 1997 estimate figured there were around 20,000 gated communities, with more than
three million units. BLAKELY & SNYDER, supra note 69, at 7. It defines a gated community as
“residential areas with restricted access in which normally public spaces are privatized. They
are security developments with designated perimeters, usually walls or fences, and controlled
entrances that are intended to prevent penetration by nonresidents.” BLAKELY & SNYDER,
supra note 69, at 2.
92

In a 1989 survey of RCAs Institute members, nine percent described their building
structure as a “high-rise” (more than five stories). RCA Characteristics and Issues, in
RESIDENTIAL COMMUNITY ASSOCIATIONS:
PRIVATE GOVERNMENTS IN THE
INTERGOVERNMENTAL SYSTEM 9, 12 (U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental
Relations ed., 1989).
93
Though no statistics are available indicating the percentage of RCAs that are
geographically isolated, a somewhat helpful indicator may be a 1989 survey of Community
Association Institute member RCAs, of which 13 percent described their location as “rural.”
Id. at 11.
94
University City, and Clayton, Missouri, wealthier sections of the St. Louis metropolitan
area, are notable for their use of access restrictions such as barriers and chains blocking access
to Association roads. Ronald J. Oakerson, Private Street Associations in St. Louis County:
Subdivisions as Service Providers, in RESIDENTIAL COMMUNITY ASSOCIATIONS: PRIVATE
GOVERNMENTS IN THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL SYSTEM 55, 58-59 (U.S. Advisory Commission
on Intergovernmental Relations ed., 1989).
95
The populations of Columbia, Maryland and Reston, Virginia stand at around 97,000
and 55,700, respectively. COMMERCIAL ATLAS AND MARKETING GUIDE (Rand McNally & Co.,
131st ed. 2000).
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self-containing function.96 While these characteristics may not literally isolate an
Association (in the sense that outsiders may not be physically barred from entrance),
they can nonetheless serve as psychologically isolating barriers.
Where in the Section I communities an informal and unofficial sense of isolation
and other-ness served as a two-way barrier at the perimeter of their communitycircles, keeping the outside world out and the community members themselves in,
the isolation of RCAs differs in two significant ways. First, it is legal in nature—the
creation of an Association establishes a legal boundary, inside of which is private
property, owned either collectively or by the Association itself.97 Thus, where the
stark cultural, linguistic, and symbolic differences that defined and limited Section I
community members’ interaction with the outside world are less likely to exist
between Association members and non-members,98 laws of trespass and the like are
available to serve a similar prophylactic function. Second, unlike the two-way
isolation of Section I communities, in which members were not only protected from
intrusion from without but also were prevented, to varying degrees, from crossing
the same barriers, RCA isolation appears to be a one-way protection. Except perhaps
in the largest RCAs (or, of course, in those populated by retirees), members leave
every day to work outside of the Association. Similarly, though Associations may
advertise the interpersonal bonds to be formed at the RCA swimming pool, or at
Association meetings, it is highly doubtful that any would go so far as to discourage
outside contacts. Likewise, there is no sense of moral superiority within RCAs, as
was seen in both Section I communities; indeed, in most RCAs, there is likely any
collectively understood morality by which to differentiate it from the outside world.
Thus, RCAs do not perpetuate the types of instrumental, affective, and moral barriers
to exit that exist within the Section I communities. “Communal” aspects, shared
instrumental goals and increased participation (considered below) notwithstanding,
RCA isolation (whether physical, psychological or legal) seems oriented solely
towards preventing intrusion from without.99
96
For example, streets may be constructed to surround the Association property entirely, or
to be a self-contained offshoot, with but one entrance point. BLAKELY & SNYDER, supra note
69, at 8.
97

But see, Marsh v. Alabama, 326 US 501 (1946) (holding that the privately owned town
in question, due to its size and public nature, is held to the Constitutional standards of a
publicly owned town).
98

This is perhaps an overstatement. Many critics of RCAs argue that the exclusionary
membership practices of some RCAs, most nefariously by race and class, contribute to and
perpetuate a segregated America. Thus, where such is the case, one can imagine that obvious
cultural and symbolic differences do exist between Association members and those who live
beyond Association boundaries. The segregating effect of RCAs is a hugely significant and
hotly contested topic in land use and local government policy. However, as it falls somewhat
outside the scope of this paper, I regrettably decline to discuss beyond this brief mention the
external effects of RCAs and their membership practices. For very compelling assertions of
this argument, see generally, MCKENZIE, supra note 70; and BLAKELY & SNYDER, supra note
69.
99
This too, though perhaps true in its most literal sense, is still probably something of an
exaggeration. Just as the existence of cultural differences between some RCAs and their
environs likely work to keep out those who “don’t belong,” those sharp differences, one can
imagine, might also work to reinforce and perhaps exaggerate the us-and-them sentiment felt
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5. Organizational Structure
It would be impossible to discuss the many variations of RCA organizational and
decision-making structures. Instead, much as I have done throughout this section, I
will attempt to focus on generalities—on how Association “government” tends to be
structured. In this vein, it is perhaps most convenient in embarking on this
generalized description, to conceive of the Association much like a corporation,
complete with a board of directors and officers. Likewise, property owners, 100 who
upon purchase automatically and compulsorily become Association members, can be
thought of as shareholders.101 Yet, where a shareholder’s interest in corporation
decisions is generally purely fiscal, an RCA’s decisions often affect the daily lives of
members in a much broader and more personal sense. Association governance
focuses on three broad areas: management of commonly owned or shared property
and facilities, provision of services, and enforcement of the CC&Rs, which regulate
behavior, uses, and aesthetics.102 It is in this broad litany of Association powers and
responsibilities, and their penetrating effects on members’ day-to-day lives, that the
debate over the nature of Association governance, as either a private corporation-like
entity or a quasi-public “private government,” finds its fuel.103 It is also these same
powers, and the increased decision-making participation the RCA form of

within the Community. As Dennis Judd writes, “the trappings of security that impregnate the
new walled communities must [remind] the inhabitants, constantly and repetitively, that the
world beyond their walls is dangerous.” Dennis R. Judd, The Rise of the New Walled Cities,
in SPATIAL PRACTICES: CRITICAL EXPLORATIONS IN SOCIAL/SPATIAL THEORY 144, 161 (Helen
Liggett & David C. Perry eds., 1995).
100

The possibility of membership and thus voting and participation rights for renting
tenants (as opposed to property owners) has been widely debated. See, e.g., supra note 84 for
a discussion of the Ellickson-Frug debate.
101

Another consequence of the public-private debate discussed in FN 84 is the potential
Constitutional uncertainty surrounding RCA voting schemes. Will the one person-one vote
rule of Reynolds v. Simms, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) apply? Currently, many RCAs grant voting
rights based on property ownership, either by the number of properties, the amount of property
(square feet, etc.), or value of property. See, e.g., Katherine Rosenberry, Condominium and
Homeowner Associations: Should They Be Treated Like ‘Mini-Governments?,’ in
RESIDENTIAL
COMMUNITY
ASSOCIATIONS:
PRIVATE
GOVERNMENTS
IN
THE
INTERGOVERNMENTAL SYSTEM 69, 72 (U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental
Relations ed., 1989).
102

DILGER, supra note 72, at 1.

103

As discussed above, this public-private debate permeates much of the RCA scholarship.
Aside from the issues related to this debate considered above (FN 83), the public-private
distinction also holds consequences for possible Association governance liability. In
members’ suits against the Association, courts have wavered in the standard by which they
judge Association action. Though courts typically attempt to distinguish between business
decisions (which invoke corporation law-type standards, like the Business Judgment Rule),
and “governmental” decisions (calling for some version of a Reasonableness standard), there
is often a significant gray area blurring this important distinction. For more, see HYATT &
FRENCH, supra note 67, at 319-25; WAYNE S. HYATT, CONDOMINIUM LAW 9, 10 (1984).
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governance makes possible, that contributes to many decisions to become
members.104
The governing documents included in the deed of sale are the backbone of RCA
government. They define not only who is a member (almost universally, property
owners), but also the rights and responsibilities of membership. Much in the same
way as a corporation’s articles of incorporation and by-laws determine the rules,
rights and responsibilities for shareholders, as well as the limits of power and legal
liabilities of the board of directors and officers, the governing documents of the RCA
(the Declaration, Articles of Incorporation, By-laws, etc.105) serve the same function
for the Association. They will generally provide for election processes and term
guidelines for representation on the Board and as Officers; they will lay out rules for
having meetings and for notice-of-meeting requirements; they will determine which
decisions may be made by the Board alone, and which may only be made upon a
vote of the membership as a whole.106 Thus, while the size of a given Board, or the
number of Officers, or the amount of responsibility placed on each member varies
greatly from Association to Association, in the most general terms, the form of
governance in RCAs may be said to be a corporation-style representative democracy,
as based on and carefully outlined in the “voluntarily” signed and assented to
governing documents.
6. Enforcement and Litigation
Throughout this section I have endeavored through comparison to the Section I
communities, to consider the significant differences between the nature of those
104

Though this increased participation is often hyped by RCAs, and is also promoted on a
theoretical level by many scholars, survey studies have found that membership participation in
Association governance may not be so prominent. A 1989 study of 579 RCA board presidents
found that “[t]he median percentage of people serving on boards, committees, or in some
voluntary basis was 11 percent. . . . In 16 percent of the associations, fewer people ran for the
board in the last election than the number of seats open.” Stephen E. Barton & Carol J.
Silverman, The Political Life of Mandatory Homeowners’ Associations, in RESIDENTIAL
COMMUNITY ASSOCIATIONS: PRIVATE GOVERNMENTS IN THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL SYSTEM 31,
35 (U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations ed., 1989).
105

“The recorded declaration of covenants for the community may include the articles of
incorporation and bylaws for the homeowners’ association, or they may incorporate them by
reference. The declaration of covenants together with . . . the articles of incorporation and the
bylaws for the association are known as the ‘governing documents’ for the community.
Together, the governing documents combine to set out both the powers and the limitations on
the powers of the homeowners’ association.” PETER M. DUNBAR & CHARLES F. DUDLEY, LAW
OF FLORIDA HOMEOWNERS’ ASSOCIATIONS 9 (Suncoast Professional Publishing Corp., 3d ed.
1997).
106

RCAs generally grant wide latitude to their Board of Directors and Officers in carrying
out Association functions. Hyatt and French provide the following as an example of how an
Association’s by-laws might provide for such Board discretion: “The Board of Directors shall
be responsible for the affairs of the Association and shall have all the powers and duties
necessary for the administration of the Association’s affairs and, as provided by law, may do
all acts and things as are not by the Declaration, Articles, or these By-laws directed to be done
and exercised exclusively by the members. . . .” HYATT & FRENCH, supra note 67, at 295. For
a more detailed picture of the roles and responsibilities of the Board of Directors, Officers, and
members generally, at least as is the case in Florida, see DUNBAR & DUDLEY, supra note 105.

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol49/iss2/5

34

2001]

THE SYMBIOTIC CIRCLE OF COMMUNITY

305

communities and that of RCAs generally. Perhaps the most telling difference, and
one that exists, at least in theory, in all Associations, may be found in the typical
RCA mechanism for social control. The formal, contractual nature of RCAs—from
membership, to the rights and responsibilities of members, to the rules and
restrictions that order much of Association life—unlike the communities of Section
I, ultimately requires and relies on external enforcement mechanisms. Thus, “[w]hen
a resident fails to conform to an association’s rules, or challenges an association’s
actions, either the resident or the association is likely to invoke the power of the
outside government to void or enforce the covenants and bylaws that define the
association’s power.”107 It is the very nature of the contractual basis of RCAs, rather
than the generally informal, unwritten, or perhaps even unspoken understandings of
the Section I communities, that acknowledges the potential need for external
enforcement and dispute resolution.108
As considered briefly above, the notion that Association membership is entirely
voluntary has been cast in doubt. From misperceptions of mandatory regulations and
responsibilities, to the coercive effects of a housing market dominated by RCAs,
there is no certainty that every member of a given Association will be willing, years
into the future, to comply with every facet of the Association’s rules and
requirements. Were such universal compliance that certain, there would be no need
for covenants to begin with.109 It is therefore in the very existence, and from
Association to Association in the specific and often complex wording, of the
governing documents, that the means of covenant enforcement is made known.110 To
be sure, each Association’s enforcement procedures are different.111 To avoid where
107
Note, The Rule of Law in Residential Associations, 99 HARV. L. REV. 472, 485 (19851986) [hereinafter Note].
108

It is doubtless that informal social control, in the form of social pressure, gossip, and the
like, is in effect in every RCA, much as it is anywhere in society. The absence of discussion
of such informal controls from the literature on RCAs is, I imagine, to some degree due simply
to the nature of the field. Where literature on the communities of Section I tends to take a
more anthropological approach, it is my experience that the literature on RCAs comes from a
more formal, legal and sociopolitical orientation. The more important point, however, is that
while such informal social control may exist, Associations nonetheless feel the need to draft
and implement written rules and procedures to be enforced by external forces, where the
communities of Section I do not.
109

“If residential associations were simply voluntary associations, there would be no need
of rules and covenants; in fact, however, they are also coercive associations.” Note, supra
note 107, at 490.
110

“The provisions of the declaration of covenants are enforceable as equitable servitudes,
and they are covenants and restrictions with which the association, each officer and director of
the association and each parcel owner and their visitors and guests must comply.” DUNBAR &
DUDLEY, supra note 105, at 89.
111

To again return to the Constitutional uncertainties surrounding the public-private
debate, courts have on numerous occasions either invalidated or refused to enforce RCAs’
rules and enforcement procedures. In finding invalid particular Associations’ regulations, the
Courts have sometimes followed Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946), restricting
Association action (particularly in the largest, most self-sufficient RCAs) to the tighter
standards of public governments. Elsewhere, in following the reasoning in Shelley v.
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possible the high costs of litigation, many use as an initial enforcement mechanism
the imposition either of fines or suspensions of privileges for the use of common
facilities.112 Significantly, most Associations provide for and ensure hearings, upon
proper and sufficient notice, at which the alleged violator is given the opportunity to
be heard in his or her own defense.113 Where such self-help is ineffective, many
Association guidelines mandate the conflicting parties to participate in ADR before
entering the courthouse.114
Regardless of the specific processes, hovering in the background of any RCA
enforcement process is the threat of litigation, and, where the Association prevails in
court, the uniquely coercive external force of the State. And lying at the heart of the
legal system are the liberal ideals of moral neutrality and individual liberty and
autonomy.115 Unlike the overwhelmingly group-oriented social control mechanisms
of the Section I communities, the litigation process aspires more neutrally to balance
the RCAs’ need for rule enforcement and group harmony with the dissenting
member’s individual rights.116 Because RCAs have little or none of the moral
orientation (and thus generally no affirmative moral or religious consensus) found in
the Section I communities, the external force of the courts is favored by RCAs and
their members for its perceived moral neutrality and objectivity. Likewise, without
the strong group cohesiveness and affectivity found in the Section I communities,
social pressure is not only undesired, but also, even were it a wanted form of
Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (though with varying degrees of strictness), Courts have refused
to enforce certain restrictive covenants, holding that the very act of enforcement would
constitute violative state action. See, e.g., Note, supra note 107. Katharine Rosenberry,
Condominium And Homeowner Associations: Should They Be Treated Like ‘MiniGovernments?,’ in RESIDENTIAL COMMUNITY ASSOCIATIONS: PRIVATE GOVERNMENTS IN THE
INTERGOVERNMENTAL SYSTEM 69 (U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental
Relations ed., 1989). Aside from these instances, however, perhaps the more greatly
impacting factor in informing the drafting of enforcement procedures is simply the free market
laws of supply and demand—Associations want to draft procedures that, when considered by
potential members (to the extent they in fact are considered), seem fair and reasonable.
112

See, e.g., DUNBAR & DUDLEY, supra note 105, at 91.

113

Id. at 92.

114

For example, in response to growing numbers of suits between RCAs and their
members, Montgomery County, Maryland, has established a non-binding, mandatory
mediation/arbitration program in which all RCA disputants must participate before moving
into the courts. RCA Characteristics and Issues, in RESIDENTIAL COMMUNITY ASSOCIATIONS:
PRIVATE GOVERNMENTS IN THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL SYSTEM 9, 19 (U.S. Advisory
Commission on Intergovernmental Relations ed., 1989).
115

See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, Liberalism, in LIBERALISM AND ITS CRITICS 60, 64 (Michael
Sandel ed., 1984) (arguing that liberal equality requires “that government must be neutral on
what might be considered the question of the good life.”).
116

Courts have voided member-challenged covenants and servitudes for a number of
reasons, including, but not limited to, when they are found to be the following: (1) racially
restrictive (Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948)); (2) arbitrary, in having no rational
relationship to the purpose of the affected land (Laguna Royale Owners Association v. Darger,
174 Cal. Rptr. 136 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981)); and (3) unreasonable, in imposing burdens on the
use of lands that substantially outweighs the restriction’s benefits (Nahrstedt v. Lakeside
Village Condominium Association, 878 P.2d 1275 (Cal. 1994)).
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informal deviance control, it would likely be far less effective. Finally, with a level
of isolation far less than that of the Oneida or Amish, the consequences of deviance
for RCA members, even at their worst, are nowhere near the life-altering levels of
Section I community members. The social control function of RCAs may be
classified as an external, liberal, rights-based, individualized one because of its
contrasts to the Section I communities, its full array of Due Process concerns, and its
(at least perceived) aspiration to objectively apply laws to formalized categories of
facts.
7. Summary
So what, then, does this reliance on litigation and external enforcement mean?
Why is it such a significant point of departure from those communities in Section I?
In answering this question, one needs only to reconsider Kanter’s three group
orientations. As I hope to have by now made clear, membership and participation in
RCAs—on the whole—are primarily focussed on Kanter’s “instrumental
orientation.” Granted, emotional, interpersonal, affective orientations at least
sometimes have a role in members’ decisions whether to join or remain in RCAs; as
discussed above, these affective qualities are both hotly advertised and to some
degree successfully realized features of RCA life.117 It is my contention, however,
that the major factors in such membership decisions are individualistic, rights-based,
instrumental considerations:
property values, cost-effective services, safety,
aesthetics.118 Individuals join RCAs for the individual benefits that membership
provides. And thus it is this cooperative endeavor for mutually agreeable individual
benefit that unites the community. Unlike the Section I communities, there is little
sense that the whole is anything more than the sum of its parts. There is no shared
belief system beyond the liberal individualism laid out in the rights-ordering
governing documents119 to empower the community on the basis of its collective
117

I remain somewhat skeptical about the frequency and intensity of these emotional
interpersonal relationships. Most basically, it should be remembered that people join RCAs
generally without knowing the other members. Stephen E. Barton and Carol J. Silverman
discuss a number of factors that from their research of numerous RCAs they believe to
contribute to social barriers between members. Stephen E. Barton & Carol J. Silverman, The
Political Life of Mandatory Homeowners’ Associations, in RESIDENTIAL COMMUNITY
ASSOCIATIONS: PRIVATE GOVERNMENTS IN THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL SYSTEM 31 (U.S.
Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations ed., 1989).
118

I would like to make very clear that my intention in distinguishing between these
“individualistic, right-based, instrumental considerations”, and those more “group-oriented” is
not to disparage RCAs or their members. It would be foolish to think that we all could find
our own Oneida Community—and for those of us (the vast majority!) who do not find comfort
in a community like those of Section I, the liberalism and right-oriented, yet cooperative
nature of the RCA may be quite appealing. Accordingly, I am simply trying to point out what
I consider a major difference between two different (and equally potentially legitimate)
community types.
119
I use the term “liberal” here with caution. It is quite possible that the restrictions of the
“rights-ordering governing documents” may be quite non-liberal indeed. As discussed above,
RCAs distinguish themselves from each other on numerous bases, quite likely sometimes to
include notions of shared values and the “non-liberal” enforcement of them. Rather, I use
“liberal” to point out that these potentially non-liberal restrictions are (at least in theory)
known to the potential members. Thus, where potential members have the freedom to choose
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moral strength to reprimand a wayward member. Where an RCA member finds a
particular restriction too onerous, he or she will deviate from it without concern for
defying the moral authority. Likewise, where the Association’s implementation of
the external social control function is perceived as sufficiently threatening, the
threatened member, on the basis of an individually/instrumentally-oriented analysis,
will either conform or quit the community.120 Far less severe among most RCAs are
the moral, affective, and instrumental barriers that prevent individuals’ exit from the
Section I communities—there is no strong moral orientation, casting a notion of
moral/religious inferiority over the outside world; and there is no intense isolation,
disabling members from either relating to people or functionally making a living
beyond the boundaries of their community-circle.
It is no great surprise that where it is these rights-based interests that compel
membership, rather than the shared community beliefs or strong interpersonal
relations and interdependence—Kanter’s moral and affective orientations—more
frequently found in the Section I communities, protection of those rights is perceived
as necessary.121 And to protect their rights when conflict arises, RCAs and their
members look, ultimately, to the state-backed coercive power of the courts. Indeed,
one could further argue that the very act of entering by covenant into an RCA is a
significant symbolic gesture emphasizing the contractual nature of the community at
the expense of the affective or moral possibilities.122 Where membership within the
Section I communities is likely attracted and maintained on the basis of moral and
affective orientations (“These are my people”, “This is my lifestyle”, “This is the
right way to live”), this same function within RCAs is probably more heavily
oriented towards individualistic instrumentalism. Thus we see that, just as was the
from numerous communities—with knowledge of the restrictions and potential non-liberal
leanings of each community—they enjoy a liberal freedom, as Charles Tiebout might say, “to
vote with their feet.” Charles Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON.
416 (1956).
120
And recall, as discussed briefly above, that for RCA members the side of the equation
warning against deviance—the consequences of deviance and possible alienation or
excommunication—does not compare to the respective cautioning factors for members of the
Section I communities.
121
This is not to ignore the point that liberalism itself may be considered a “shared
community belief.” Indeed, this idea will be considered in a more head-on fashion below. For
purposes of this Section, I wish only to make the distinction between the “shared community
belief” of liberalism and the “shared community beliefs” of the Section I communities. As I
find this distinction a relatively intuitive one to make, but a far more difficult one to put
fruitfully into words, perhaps it will suffice to make the following hypothetical observation: it
is far easier to imagine a Communitarian living happily in an RCA than it is to imagine a
liberal atheist living happily among the Amish. In fact, two scholars of the RCA movement
have noted that the behavior of members is not always so liberal to begin with, finding in their
study of numerous RCAs that “[m]embers support the restrictions inherent in the CID as they
apply to others, but resent the restrictions on their own activities.” Barton & Silverman, supra
note 117, at 31, 35.
122

See, e.g., James L. Winokur, Rejoinder: Reforming Servitude Regimes: Toward
Associational Federalism And Community, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 537 (1990) (in part lamenting at
least one example of what he perceives as an unfortunate reliance on legal remedies, rather
than informal, interpersonal ones, for RCA members’ conflicts).
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case with the communities of Section I, it is the core community values of RCAs—
the cooperative but rights-protective pursuit of liberal, individualistic and
instrumental goals—that informs the RCA model of social control. And yet at the
same time, the use of this rights-based, liberal social control mechanism works to
protect and perpetuate those same core values. In this sense, just as the social control
mechanisms of Section I were symbiotically related to the natures and functions of
those communities and the collective ideologies that formed them, so too does the
external, liberal, rights-based social control of RCAs both rely on and perpetuate an
individualistic, instrumental, rights-oriented mentality and a predominantly
gesellschaft nature.
IV. SECTION III.
A. Harvard College
1. Background123
Harvard College was founded in 1636, named for its first donor, the Reverend
John Harvard, who left to the school his personal library and half his estate. The
College expanded into a multi-disciplinary university during the late-18th and 19th
Centuries, beginning with the creation of a medical studies graduate program in
1782, law and divinity programs in 1816 and 1817, respectively, and a main library
building in 1841. The University continued to grow throughout the 20th Century: the
professional schools acquired new buildings over its first three decades; Widener
Library was constructed in 1915; The Fogg Museum was built in 1927. In 1943, the
instruction of Radcliffe124 undergraduates became the formal responsibility of the
Harvard Faculty of Arts and Sciences, and over the next three years nearly all
courses were made coeducational. Twenty years later, Radcliffe graduates were
awarded Harvard degrees. In 1999, the merger of the two schools was effectively
completed, as Harvard College assumed full responsibility for the education of
undergraduate women, and Radcliffe College was transformed into the Radcliffe
Institute for Advanced Study, a non-degree-conferring interdisciplinary center for
advanced study across an array of fields.
Today, Harvard University consists of Harvard College, the Graduate School of
Arts and Sciences, as well eight other full faculties. Its campus area, split between
Cambridge and Boston, covers about 500 acres. The University has a regular
enrollment of approximately 17,000 full time students, and a faculty and staff
numbering about 20,000. It is likely the single most recognized and well-known
academic institution in the world.

123

All the information in this Background subsection was obtained from the Harvard
University
web
site,
at
http://www.registrar.fas.harvard.edu/handbooks/student/
introduction.html (last visited March 1, 2002).
124

Radcliffe College, Harvard College’s sister-school, was founded in 1879. See
HARVARD UNIVERSITY, FACULTY OF ARTS AND SCIENCES, STUDENT HANDBOOK, at
http://www.registrar.fas.harvard.edu/handbooks/student/introduction.html (last visited March
1, 2002).

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2001

39

310

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49:271

2. Individualism and Self-Realization
Harvard College, like any college, is more than a simple collection of classes,
students and teachers. It is a particular and intentionally created and maintained
environment, and within that environment it is an academic community. Unlike the
less formally established communities of Section I,125 Harvard College is a single
community with available, official statements of purpose and goals. For example, as
stated in the Faculty of Arts and Sciences Student Handbook:
A fundamental goal of the College is to foster an environment in which its
members may live and work productively together, making use of the rich
resources of the University, in individual and collective pursuit of
academic excellence, extracurricular accomplishment, and personal
challenge. In the words of the Resolution on Rights and Responsibilities
adopted by the Faculty of Arts and Sciences on April 14, 1970, ‘By
accepting membership in the University, an individual joins a community
ideally characterized by free expression, free inquiry, intellectual honesty,
respect for the dignity of others, and openness to constructive change.’
For this goal to be achieved, the community must be a tolerant and
supportive one, characterized by civility and consideration for others
Therefore the standards and expectations of this community are high, as
much so in the quality of interpersonal relationships as they are in
academic performance.126
The above statement provides insight into the dualism and potentially conflicting
ambitions of the Harvard College community. Many of the ideal characterizations
above—“free expression,” “free inquiry”—may be labeled as liberal, individualistic
ones. Meanwhile, others of the aspirations—“to foster an environment in which its
members may live and work productively together . . . in individual and collective
pursuit of . . . excellence . . .”—hint at the communalism and group orientation of the
Section I communities. As I hope the discussion in this Section will show, the
Harvard College community is an interesting mixture of the instrumentalism and
right-based gesellschaft relations common to the RCA’s, and the group-oriented,
ideology-based gemeinschaft orientation that marks the Section I communities.
Where most RCA’s are predominantly gesellschaft-based, formed around
cooperative, corporation-like efforts to realize individual aims, Harvard College
(though not without its instrumentalism and solely instrumentally-minded
members127) puts particular emphasis on interpersonal interaction and exploration.
Indeed, the Resolution on Rights and Responsibilities, cited above, raises this

125
The College’s charter, under which it still operates today, was granted by the
Massachusetts Bay Colony in 1650, with subsequent amendment and further definition in the
Massachusetts Constitution of 1780. See id.
126

FACULTY OF ARTS & SCIENCES, FAS HANDBOOK ch. 4 (2001) (italics added).

127

Though instrumental orientations take numerous forms, some likely examples to be
found among Harvard College community members might include the following: the future
personal benefits of a Harvard degree, desire to please parents and family, wanting to live in
the Boston area, etc.
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aspiration for the collective creation of a “super-liberal” environment arguably to the
level of an ideology: “The University . . . has a special autonomy and reasoned
dissent plays a particularly vital part in its existence. . . . The University must affirm,
assure and protect the rights of its members to organize and join political
associations, convene and conduct public meetings, publicly demonstrate and picket
in orderly fashion, advocate, and publicize opinion by print, sign, and voice.”128
Some RCAs may come close to this conception of a collectively created and
maintained environment. But where RCAs as a whole can reasonably be analogized
to a corporation (and the essentially faceless, though cooperative, relationship
between shareholders/RCA-members), it is an essential characteristic of the Harvard
College community that its members share (rather than merely cooperate) in the
formation of a particular environment.
Yet while Harvard College may not be the strictly gesellschaftian community
that many RCAs may be, it also does not fit neatly into the group of communities in
Section I. This is so mainly for three different reasons. First, though Harvard does
share with those communities a strong focus and reliance on shared beliefs, it is the
nature of these beliefs that distinguishes it. Unlike the Section I communities’
emphasis on submission to the group, the underlying ideology that unites the
Harvard community is, in the goal it envisions, essentially an individualistic one—
the shared aspiration towards, and collective maintenance of an environment that
promotes, individualistically-minded self-realization. Second, for a number of
reasons to be considered more fully below (the transient nature of the student body,
existing external ties, family pressure, to name just three), Harvard College
community members are likely to place more weight on the instrumental purposes
behind their membership than their Section I counterparts. And third, also due to
Harvard College’s less intense level of isolation, the consequences of student
deviance—and the risk of alienation or perhaps expulsion from the community—is
surely understood in far less drastic terms as it is among the members of the Section
I communities. It is thus my contention that the Harvard College community is a
unique synthesis of gemeinschaft and gesellschaft: it is a community of both
instrumental and non-instrumental orientations, bound by the community-wide
creation of an environment amenable to the collective ideological aspiration of
individualistic self-realization.
3. Communalism
The communalism of Harvard College is a blend of the many variations on
communalism that have been considered thus far. Like the RCAs, the members of
the Harvard College community enjoy the shared use of common facilities and
services—from athletic facilities to libraries to computer services to common grassy
areas like the Harvard Yard.129 While these common areas and facilities may not be
128
Resolution on Rights and Responsibilities, approved and signed by the Faculty of Arts
and Sciences on April 14, 1970. See HARVARD UNIVERSITY, FACULTY OF ARTS AND SCIENCES,
RESOLUTION ON RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES (1970), at http://www.registrar.fas.harvard.edu/
handbooks/student/chapter4/community.html [hereinafter RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES].
129
HARVARD UNIVERSITY, FACULTY OF ARTS & SCIENCES, REGULATIONS CONCERNING THE
USE
OF
UNIVERSITY
RESOURCES,
at
http://www.registrar.fas.harvard.edu/
handbooks/student/chapter4/conduct.html (last visited March 1, 2002) (including a section on
regulations concerning the use of university resources, focussing most particularly on
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owned by the students—and are accordingly less likely to inspire as deep a sense of
interconnected responsibility for their maintenance as would be found in most
RCAs—their common use of and often significant reliance on these facilities are
likely to engender, if not economic interdependence, some sense of social
interconnectedness and communalism.
Like the Oneida Community, Harvard College students live together,130 eat meals
together, attend classes together, and often spend most of their extracurricular time
together as well. Though Harvard College is not literally self-sufficient in the
Oneidan sense (no food is produced, etc.), the level of service provision and the
variety of outlets, pursuits, and activities available within the community make it
possible for its members to remain within the campus indefinitely. In this sense, the
College may be compared not only to the Oneida, but also to at least some of the
more self-contained RCAs.
However, unlike the Oneida, who endeavored to create a community-wide
primary group, Harvard College is subdivided in numerous different ways. Most
significantly, there are more than 6700 College students.131 Though the College
campus is relatively compact compared to many American colleges, at almost no
time are all the members of the Harvard College community together in the same
room or outdoor area. Rather, the community is divided into classes. And probably
more significantly, aside from first-year students it is divided among the Houses
(discussed below). Academic areas of concentration, extracurricular activities and
clubs, and other informal divisions also work to create subgroups within the
community. Also, unlike all the Section I communities, and perhaps also unlike
RCAs, the Harvard College student community is a transient one, as very few
students remain members for more than four years. One imagines that this factor
could not help but limit the intensity of interconnectedness and communal
responsibility felt between students.
Yet while the transience of the community members, and the numerous divisions
within the community as a whole, may serve in some way to diminish the overall
sense of communalism at Harvard College, there are a number of significant
commonalities among most, if not all, students that combats these de-communalizing
factors. Perhaps most significantly (and found to this degree in none of the other
communities above, except perhaps for some particularly specialized RCAs), there is
a homogeneity of age among College community members. Though this fact alone
by no means ensures any increased sense of communalism, it likely leads to a
heightened similarity in tastes, activities, and interests that serve to enhance
communalism. Similarly, this homogeneity of age (in the sense that the majority of
community members are young adults, generally living on their own away from
home for the first extended period of time) also works to emphasize the shared
ambition towards self-realization discussed above. In consideration of this
aspiration, the Resolution on Rights and Responsibilities (cited in the block quote
regulating use of the libraries and computer networks, but also on activity in common areas,
for example prohibiting bicycle riding in Harvard Yard. College rules and regulations like
these are quite similar to those concerning regulation of common facility use of the RCA’s).
130

All but a very few undergraduates live in on-campus dormitory housing. THE INSIDER’S
GUIDE TO THE COLLEGES 426 (2001).
131

Id. at 424.
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above), places special emphasis on the following rights-based freedoms: “freedom of
speech and academic freedom, freedom from personal force and violence, and
freedom of movement,” such that “[i]nterference with these freedoms must be
regarded as a serious violation of the personal rights upon which the community is
based.”132 Thus, to summarize, communalism may be perceived at Harvard College
in four ways: (1) communal living and shared facilities and common grounds; (2)
the self-contained nature of campus life; (3) the relatively homogenous nature of
student community members; and (4) the common, cooperative and
interdependent—albeit individualized—pursuit of self-realization. With these four
characteristics in mind, we can see how Harvard College’s brand of communalism is
a neat blend of both the gesellschaft-oriented, cooperative communalism of most
RCAs, and the more gemeinschaft-inspired and –inspiring version of the Amish and
Oneida.
4. Isolation
Harvard College is located in Cambridge, Massachusetts, a city of more than
90,000 people,133 directly across the Charles River from Boston. Though many of
the College’s buildings are scattered throughout the Harvard Square area of
Cambridge, the heart of the College—those buildings on and around Harvard Yard—
is enclosed by a series of metal gates. Presumably, anyone may pass through these
gates and into the yard. Yet, their mere presence (and that of the Harvard University
campus police officers regularly positioned at the major gate openings) surely has
some affect on both Harvard College students and non-students alike. Additionally,
beyond the gates, some College buildings, the residence Houses in particular, posses
similar external features likely to indicate to passers-by an affiliation with Harvard.
In part because of these distinctively collegiate buildings and external features, as
well as Harvard’s long history and renown, Harvard University (and particularly the
College) takes on an almost ubiquitous presence in the Harvard Square area of
Cambridge. Yet, because many of the buildings outside Harvard Yard bear no
obvious indication of affiliation with Harvard, as ever-present as Harvard may be in
and around Harvard Square, there is often no telling whether any given building is or
is not part of Harvard College. Accordingly, the distinction between the Harvard
College community and its surrounding environs—the distinction giving rise to
isolation—is, at least in a physical sense, not always clear.
Even beyond this strictly physical/structural sense of isolation, the distinction
between College students and non-students, while obvious to some, can still be
somewhat vague. As discussed above, the particular homogeneity of the Harvard
College population—most particularly in age and tastes, but also as a result of
similar day-to-day activities—Harvard College students are by appearance, though
surely with exceptions, a relatively distinct community. Yet, in part because of the
large number of colleges in Boston, while it may be possible generally to tell college
students from non-students, to distinguish Harvard College students in particular is
not always so easy. In much the same way that Harvard College buildings seem
omnipresent throughout the Harvard Square area of Cambridge, so too does one get
the sense that, while surrounded by Harvard College students, it may not be possible
132

See RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES, supra note 128.

133

COMMERCIAL ATLAS AND MARKETING GUIDE, supra note 95, at 376.
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to pick them out with perfect accuracy. In this sense, the non-physical/structural
isolating features of the Harvard College community fall somewhere between the
very overt traits of the Amish and the nearly imperceptible identifiers of most RCA
members. Significantly, much like the one-way version of isolation found among
many RCAs (though to far lesser degree), one might suppose that Harvard College
students have an easier time picking out other Harvard College students than would a
non-student.134 To summarize, then, it might be said that, in comparison to the
communities considered above, the isolation of the Harvard College community is
(1) not as spatially constructed as the Oneida or some of the more secluded RCAs;
(2) somewhere between the two-way isolation of the Amish, open and obvious to
outsiders, and the more one-way isolation of the RCAs, whose members’ identities
(as RCA members) are frequently not identifiable to non-members; and (3) from the
perspective of the members, more self-contained and broadly life-encompassing (and
thus probably more identity-creating) than most RCAs.
5. Organizational Structure
Before considering the organizational structure of Harvard College, an important
distinction must be made between, on the one hand, the relationship between the
College community considered in this section (the student body) and the governing
structure, and on the other hand the relationship between the various communities
considered in the other sections and their respective governing structures. Where in
those communities the participating decision-makers are all also members of the
community, the majority of key decision makers at Harvard College are not members
of the Harvard College student body. Though students do have input into the
decision-making and governing structures and processes, either through formal
participation135 or through informal advocacy and protest, students are not generally
the essential players in Harvard College governance. In some sense this distinction
does skew somewhat the comparison between Harvard College and the “selfgoverned” communities in the previous sections.136 Yet, because accepted students

134
This is likely to be true for several reasons. First, and most simply, students are likely
to recognize each other from classes, activities or Houses. Also, it is seems reasonable to
presume that students will have more familiarity with informal indicators of membership: tshirts that hint at membership, particular books, verbal indications of membership, etc
135
The Harvard-Radcliffe Undergraduate Council was established in 1982 “to serve as an
advocate for student concerns, organize campus-wide social events, and provide funding for
student organizations.” HARVARD UNIVERSITY, FACULTY OF ARTS AND SCIENCES, HARVARDRADCLIFFE UNDERGRADUATE COUNCIL, at
http://www.registrar.fas.harvard.edu/
handbooks/student/chapter5/student_government.html (last visited March 1, 2002). The
Council is comprised of fifty-one members, some elected by the student body as a whole,
others from the residential Houses, or from “freshmen districts.” Id. The Council is divided
into three committees: Student Affairs, Campus Life, and Finance. Id. Each year, members of
these committees are selected to participate on the Faculty’s three advisory committees: the
Committee on Undergraduate Education, the Committee on House Life, and the Committee on
College Life. Id. Additionally, the Council is responsible for supervising elections of
undergraduates to participate in numerous student-faculty standing committees. Id.
136

Though do recall that some critics have questioned the common conception that
participation in local governmental decision-making is enhanced by RCAs. Likewise,
remember from Section I that while many decisions were made in an egalitarian, democratic
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have the freedom to choose to become members of the Harvard College community
(to enroll),137 it is not unreasonable to acknowledge that these students have chosen
Harvard, at least in a theoretical sense, because they were comfortable with the
governing structure. In this sense, though students may not be directly involved in
the organizational and decision-making structure, it may be presumed that there is no
less of a link between the Harvard College community and its governance than in the
other “self-governed” communities.
That said, what follows is a brief account of Harvard College’s place within the
University’s organizational structure, as well as a description of the core decisionmaking bodies within the College itself. Harvard College, along with the Graduate
School of Arts and Sciences, comprise the two main sub-bodies of the Faculty of
Arts and Sciences (FAS). FAS is the largest of the University’s nine faculties, and is
under the direct control of the Dean of the Faculty of Arts and Sciences. Beyond the
authority of the Dean, the many functions of FAS are overseen by the President and
Provost of the University, its two Governing Boards, the Harvard Corporation, and
the Board of Overseers.
Within Harvard College, the head administrative official is the Dean of Harvard
College. Under his authority, a number of other Associate and Assistant Deans hold
offices, each with a specified area of responsibility, including oversight of student
activities, housing, financial aid, service and volunteerism, coeducation, and the like.
The office of the Dean of Harvard College also has authority over such specific
offices as the Registrar of the Faculty of Arts and Sciences, the Office of Career
Services, and the Freshman Dean’s Office. Finally, also under the Dean’s direction
is the Administrative Board, which implements and enforces academic rules and
regulations.138 Perhaps with even more direct impact on the daily lives of students,
after their first year (during which time they are most directly under the purview of
the Freshman Dean’s Office), they are divided up among thirteen residential Houses.
Each House is directed by a House Master, an Allston Burr Senior Tutor, and
numerous resident and non-resident tutors, who together direct the majority of
student social and extracurricular life.

way, this process was in a sense really only partially democratic, with few community leaders
making (or at least making recommendations as to) the major decisions.
137
For a number of obvious reasons, this may be something of an overstatement. First,
there are many factors besides governing and decision-making structures that, one imagines,
are more heavily weighted in potential students’ minds when they decide to enroll at Harvard.
Second, it is quite unlikely that potential students, in deciding whether to enroll at Harvard,
know anything at all regarding the College’s systems and processes of governance. Third,
even with this information, it is doubtful that any other similarly situated college has a system
of governance that differs from Harvard’s in any meaningful way. Finally, those students who
do enroll, only to discover that they are in fact not comfortable with Harvard College
governance, face numerous barriers (real and perceived) either to transferring to another
college or dropping out altogether.
138

The Administrative Board will be considered in more detail below.
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6. Administrative Board
The central formal mechanism of social control within the Harvard College
community is the Administrative Board.139 The Board, created by and deriving its
authority from the Faculty of Arts and Sciences, is comprised of two groups: (1)
teaching faculty and senior administrators; and (2) Senior Tutors and Assistant
Deans of Freshmen. Thus, Board membership is split between the “authority
figures” of the faculty and administration and the more personally familiar
(significantly, though, non-student) Tutors and Assistant Deans. Though the Board
serves numerous purposes, this paper will focus particularly on its responsibility for
“any undergraduate disciplinary case for which there is governing faculty legislation
and/or for which there is precedent for interpreting and applying the rules and
standards of conduct of the College.”140 (Cases for which there is no clear precedent,
policy, or faculty legislation have recently come under the authority of the StudentFaculty Judicial Board, which will be discussed below.)
Once information of transgressive behavior has been brought to the attention of
the violating student’s resident dean, the procedure of the Administrative Board
ordinarily begins with an informal conversation between the allegedly deviant
student and that dean, during which the two will discuss the incident in depth to
ensure a clear understanding. Next, the student is asked to prepare a statement to be
reviewed by the Board, with three goals in mind: (1) tell the story in full; (2) reflect
on the event (“[Y]ou should state clearly your understanding of why the actions
taken were in violation of a rule or standard (if they were)...and what you think about
the event after time for reflection”); and (3) draw some lessons (“It is important for
139
As I pointed out in regard to the devices of social control within RCAs, there are surely
informal mechanisms—gossip, “peer pressure”, etc.—at work in the Harvard College
community. Just as with the RCAs, however, the mere existence of more formal controls,
here in the form of the Administrative Board, is an indication that the informal social control
functions within the community are considered (at least by the administration) insufficient.
Yet, from the perspective of the potential deviant, there is also an additional external informal
factor at work at Harvard College which is likely absent from the RCA’s. Adding to a
student’s equation in deciding whether to deviate—and thus risk punishment, or even
expulsion—students generally must also consider the often overwhelmingly persuasive force
of their families. In comparison, it is doubtful that being made to leave an RCA carries with it
the same sort of social weight as being expelled from Harvard College. This additional factor
may be imagined as added weight in favor of conformity on the potential deviant’s decisionmaking scale. This consideration, as well as the similar factors involved in both the relative
youth of Harvard College students and the risk of serious future harm that likely comes with
official sanction or expulsion, will be discussed in more detail in the concluding remarks at the
end of this paper.
140
See HARVARD UNIVERSITY, FACULTY OF ARTS AND SCIENCES, THE ADMINISTRATIVE
BOARD OF HARVARD COLLEGE, at http://www.registrar.fas.harvard.edu/handbooks/student/
chapter4/adboard.html (last visited March 1, 2002). The Board also focuses its efforts on
cases of academic review of unsatisfactory records. While this paper will not consider this
area of Administrative Board jurisdiction, it should be noted, based on the academic nature of
the Harvard College community, that such unsatisfactory academic performance (to the extent
that it falls short of the aspirations of individual community member behavior) is not wholly
outside the scope of this paper. Yet, because unsatisfactory academic performance is not
necessarily deviance per se, in that it does not often threaten the nature of the community, it
has no useful analogue in the other communities considered above.
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you to think about . . . how you might behave differently in similar circumstances in
the future . . . and . . . how this experience has caused you to change or grow.”)141
FAS materials explain that the latter two goals are set in light of the Board’s
“interest[ ] in a larger educational view of student behavior.”142
If, after the initial in-depth conversation and drafting of the student statement,
formal discipline is thought likely, the student has the right to appear before the
board when the case is presented. He or she has the right to have another University
officer present to serve as personal adviser. Once at the hearing, the resident dean
makes a preliminary oral report of his or her findings, after which, the student may
make opening remarks. The Board may then question the student, after which the
student is given a final opportunity to be heard. When the hearing is concluded, the
student leaves the room, and the Board begins its deliberations. Where upon
deliberation the Board determines that wrongdoing has occurred, and that
disciplinary action is appropriate, it may choose from five options with increasing
severity: (1) warn or admonish; (2) disciplinary probation; (3) requirement to
withdraw for disciplinary reasons (where readmission, after time away from
Harvard, is likely); (4) dismissal (where readmission, after a time away, is possible,
though only upon a vote of the Faculty of Arts and Sciences); and (5) expulsion
(without possibility of readmission).143 Though Board decisions are considered final,
FAS may review and, if it deems proper, amend any Board decision.144
“Recognizing that there are some issues that the Administrative Board’s standard
procedures could not address appropriately,” in 1987, the Faculty established the
Student-Faculty Judicial Board.145 In taking on such unprecedented cases, then, FAS
acknowledged that one of the core effects of the Board would be in effect
establishing community standards on the basis of its decisions.146 With this in mind,
the Board’s membership is divided equally among six faculty members and six
students, all selected by lot.147 Yet while this more student-inclusive mechanism is a
significant symbolic gesture to the merits of having student participation in
determinations likely to affect community norms and standards, in its thirteen year
existence, the Student-Faculty Judicial Board has heard but one single case.
Accordingly, its symbolic significance notwithstanding, further consideration of the
Board seems unnecessary.
141

FACULTY OF ARTS & SCIENCES, THE ADMINISTRATIVE BOARD OF HARVARD COLLEGE: A
USER’S GUIDE FOR STUDENTS 6 (2001) [hereinafter USER’S GUIDE].
142

Id.

143

In the 1999-2000 academic year, of 113 affirmative disciplinary cases brought before
the Administrative Board, in fourteen cases the Board took no action, sixty-four cases resulted
in a decision to admonish, twenty-one cases ended in probation, and in fourteen cases the
student was required to withdraw. USER’S GUIDE, supra note 141, at 21.
144

Id. at 7.

145

HARVARD UNIVERSITY, FACULTY OF ARTS AND SCIENCES, THE STUDENT-FACULTY
JUDICIAL BOARD, at http://www.registrar.fas.harvard.edu/handbooks/student/chapter4/
adboard.html (last visited March 1, 2002).
146

Id.

147

In addition, “the Dean of [Harvard] College and the Administrative Dean of the
Graduate School [of Arts and Sciences will serve as] ex officio non-voting members.” Id.
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Just as the Harvard College community may be seen, in certain respects, to be a
synthesis of those features predominant in the Section I communities and those
predominant in the RCAs, so too may its main social control mechanism—the
Administrative Board—be considered as such a synthesis of those two communities’
respective mechanisms. In some respects, the Administrative Board is reminiscent
of the processes utilized by the RCAs. With its emphasis on procedural safeguards
and the rights of students—the right to ask that the case be heard by the FacultyStudent Judicial Board; the right to appear and be heard by the Administrative
Board; the right to have an advocate present at the hearing; the Board’s following,
where possible, of prior precedent; the right to appeal the Board’s determination to
FAS—in certain respects the Harvard College social control function, like that of the
RCAs, may be described as formal, procedural, and rights-oriented. To the extent
that this is the case, it is evidence that, like the RCAs and unlike the Section I
communities, social control within Harvard College may be considered
gesellschaftian—its formality, strict procedure, aspirations of neutrality, and minimal
participation by other members of the community work against the use of or reliance
on interpersonal, group-first gemeinschaft relations.
In other respects, however, the Administrative Board seems more similar to the
processes of the Section I communities. First, though there is some detailed
explication of students’ rights, the procedures of the Administrative Board lack the
full litany of procedural safeguards present in actual litigation: there is no absolute
right to present and/or cross-examine witnesses; there is no jury of peers (indeed,
with the exception of the little-used Student-Faculty Judicial Board, there is no
participation in the process by fellow-students); there is no absolute right of appeal.
Second, as mentioned briefly above, of the 113 affirmative cases heard in the 19992000 academic year, only fourteen resulted in a requirement to withdraw, none of
which were of the variety making readmission anything short of probable.148 In fact,
more than half the 113 cases resulted in a decision to “admonish,” which, not
considered a formal disciplinary action, is more a statement to the student and the
community condemning the student’s actions. Third, as seen above, in the goals of
the student statement, the Administrative Board distinguishes itself from a court of
law in that it not only wishes to determine “guilt” or “innocence,” but also, in line
with its role within an academic institution, hopes to inspire the deviant student to
reflect on and learn from his or her transgressions. Finally, like the Section I
communities (and unlike the RCAs), the Administrative Board is an internal social
control mechanism.149 As such, it may create its own precedent, based on the
collective norms and ideologies of the community. As particularly seen in the 1987
decision to establish the Student-Faculty Judicial Board, the Harvard College
mechanism for social control is one which aspires to make determinations—and

148

Of sixty-three Petitions for Readmission heard in the 1999-2000 academic year, only
six were denied. USER’S GUIDE, supra note 141, at 21.
149

Where violations of law have occurred, the Administrative Board, though generally
allowing first for the completion of court proceedings, will nonetheless proceed with the
Administrative Board hearing, to pursue its own disciplinary determination. As the User’s
Guide explains, “The College ordinarily will defer consideration of a case at least for a
reasonable period of time if a criminal investigation or proceeding is pending in relation to a
disciplinary case.” Id. at 7.
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thereby affect future community behavior—in a manner coordinate with and
informed by the shared norms and values of the community.
7. Summary
I have attempted to show that both the underlying values and aspirations of the
Harvard College community and its social control mechanisms represent a synthesis
of the gemeinschaft and the gesellschaft. Like the dominant characteristics of the
Section I communities, the Harvard College community is marked by such grouporiented notions as shared common facilities, living quarters, and services. For many
students, like the members of the Oneida Community, Harvard College is a selfcontained and isolated environment. Likewise, due in part to the homogeneity of
age, the commonality of pursuits among Harvard students, and the isolation
engendered by these factors, identity as Harvard College community members is
likely quite strong. Perhaps most significantly, as evidenced by many of the official
statements considered above, the Harvard College community as a whole pursues a
shared aspiration: collectively to create an environment in which individuality and
self-realization may flourish.
On the other hand, the Harvard College community is in certain respects not
unlike the generalized account of the RCAs described above. The instrumental
benefits of membership in the Harvard Community are likely central factors in many
potential students’ decisions whether to enroll. Much like some of the RCAs, while
the Harvard College community may be for many students a self-contained and
absorbing environment, students throughout their membership in the community
maintain close external ties with family and friends outside the community.
Similarly, the many divisions within the community—on the basis of House
affiliation, class year, academic concentration, or extracurricular participation—work
against the creation of the community-wide primary group that characterized the
Oneida. Finally, while the ambition for a self-realization-friendly environment may
be a collective one, to which the community as a whole aspires, the purpose behind
that collective pursuit is nonetheless of an individualistic nature. In this sense, it
may be stated that the shared value at the core of the Harvard College community
falls somewhere between the group-oriented gemeinschaftian values of Oneidan
Perfectionism and Amish Gelassenheit, and the gesellschaftian individualism and
instrumentalism of the RCAs.
If the previous Sections of this paper have provided any guidance at all, it should
come as little surprise that, just as the shared values of the Harvard College
community synthesize the predominant qualities of the Section I communities and
the RCAs, so too does Harvard’s Administrative Board represent a similar synthesis
of those communities’ respective social control mechanisms. The procedures of the
Administrative Board contain some formal qualities—an explicit, precedent-based
procedure with numerous safeguards for the rights of students charged with
violations—found in the RCAs’ external mechanism. Similarly, the absence of
student participation on the Administrative Board is far more similar to the external
procedures of the RCAs than the internal and highly participatory processes of the
Oneida and Amish. Yet, at the same time, the Administrative Board is in many
respects informal. For example, the Harvard Administration places explicit
emphasis on the following: (1) warnings and admonishments; (2) the process’s
educational possibilities for transgressing students; and (3) through the creation of
the Student-Faculty Judicial Board, the possible inclusion of students in any
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determination with likely implications for future perceptions of community
standards. Thus, as was shown to be the case in each of the communities considered
previously, the core values of Harvard College are in a symbiotic relationship with
the principles and procedures of the community’s social control mechanism. Just as
the Administrative Board’s blend of formal and informal qualities, with their mixture
of individual rights-based and group-based orientations, feeds off the similar mixture
of gemeinschaft and gesellschaft relations within the community, so too is this
combination of community characteristics and shared values affirmed and reaffirmed
by the social control function of the Administrative Board. In short, Harvard
College, in both its underlying shared values and its mechanisms for social control,
represents a synthesis of the gemeinschaft and gesellschaft orientations dominant in
the Section I communities and the RCAs, respectively.
V. SECTION IV
A. The Dangers And Limits Of Community
Before concluding, and in light of the numerous instances throughout this paper
in which I chose to sidestep the issue of the potential dangers of community social
control to members’ individual rights and integrity, I would like to take this
opportunity to consider this very important matter. In considering these dangers, it
seems most useful to ask the question: What ought to be the role of the state (either
formally, as government, or informally, as a nation-wide community) in monitoring
community social control functions of the various types of communities considered
in this paper? To make this assessment, we must first try to understand, from the
viewpoint of the individual member, the natures of the potential dangers present in
each community, and then balance our responsibility to account for these dangers
with a need to respect, from the perspective of the group, the unique qualities of the
communities, and their desires for isolation, insularity, and autonomy.
From the perspective of concern for individual group members, it seems an
impossible task to monitor each and every instance of internal social control. A far
more reasonable way to approach the issue, then, is to attempt to monitor members’
abilities, where they feel they have been deprived of their rights, either to externally
seek redress or simply leave the community. In this regard, perhaps the most
significant risks presented are the barriers to exit discussed on several occasions
throughout this paper. Where affective, moral and instrumental orientations towards
the group are strong, it would seem, these ties can create a reliance and dependence
on the community, its beliefs and its membership, often preventing unhappy or
dissatisfied members from ever leaving.
Where affective orientations are strong—where, as was seen among the Oneida,
ties between members represent most or, perhaps even all, of a member’s
interpersonal relations—a member considering exit is faced with a wholly unfamiliar
outside world, with no relations to contact or ask for help. What is more, where such
a member has spent his or her entire life in the community, he or she will likely
(depending on the extent to which the community’s customs, practices and standards
of behavior deviate from the outside world) have a difficult time interacting with and
relating to people outside the community.150 Though there are many factors that
150
Recall that this concern for child-members born into the community cut to the heart of
the debate in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). A similar example can be found
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might contribute within a given community to a heightened (and perhaps potentially
dangerous) affective orientation, of those considered most carefully in this paper, it
would seem that the combination of isolation and communalism would have a
particularly strong effect. Where members of the community feel a sense of
interdependence and interconnectedness with each other, and where the communitycircle overlaps with few other community-circles, members are likely to feel
dependent on membership, and thus less likely to feel capable of exit. Additionally,
as was seen in both the Oneida and Amish, where Community boundary-control
mechanisms rely on informal social pressure—where the ordinarily gesellschaftian
function of social control is infused with gemeinschaft relations—affective ties, and
thus affective barriers to exit, are intensified.
Moral barriers to exit may be understood as a member’s inability to leave the
community because of a belief, taught and practiced fervently within the community,
in the community’s moral, ethical or religious superiority. Where a community
teaches its members that their own belief system, pattern of behavior, membership or
way of life is superior to, or at least extremely different from, that of the outside
world, individual members will, one imagines, be less inclined to leave the
community, even where they feel they are being treated unfairly or cruelly by the
community. For example, the Oneidan notion of Perfectionism, which instilled in
members a belief that the nature of their community was more amendable to a sinfree, godly life than the outside world, likely made members’ decisions to exit the
Community into that corrupt, inferior outside world far more difficult. Further, as
was true to an extent with both the Section I communities, where insularity and
intense isolation are central to a community’s ideology—such that intermingling at
all with non-members is discouraged or banned—moral barriers are intensified and
members become increasingly disabled from choosing to exit their communities.151
The spectrum of barriers that might be considered instrumental is more of a
catch-all; aside from those barriers affective or moral, it is (1) all of the required
skills, knowledge, and abilities for a successful existence in mainstream society that
are not provided, for one reason or another, in a particular community; and (2) the
detrimental consequences of leaving the community, which, for an individual
member would militate strongly against exit. Possible examples of this first sort of
among ultra-Orthodox Jewish communities, where very stringent restrictions exist regarding
interactions between unrelated men and women. It is not hard to imagine how difficult it
might be for a person having grown up in such a community to leave the community and be
able successfully and meaningfully to interact with and relate to people in mainstream society.
151
For example, in many of the RCAs, where there is a sense that the RCA-as-gatedcommunity is a safe haven from the crime and danger of the outside world, members are
probably less inclined to venture outside the RCA gates. Thus, we see that these moral
barriers can easily lead to and blend into affective barriers as well. Yet, while insularity is
often intertwined with the moral/ethical superiority or individuality discussed in the text just
above, the two are not necessarily the same thing. For example, a community with a sense of
moral superiority but without insularity might value proselytizing, which by definition would
provide contact with non-members. For an interesting consideration of two ideologically
fairly similar communities—the Satmar and Lubavitch Hassidic Jews—differing in large part
on the basis of their opposing views of interaction with outsiders and proselytizing, see the
following: ROBERT EISENBERG, BOYCHIKS IN THE HOOD (1998); ISRAEL RUBIN, SATMAR: AN
ISLAND IN THE CITY (1972); Stephen Sharot, Hasidim in Modern Society, in ESSENTIAL PAPERS
ON HASIDISM (Gershon David Hundert ed., 1991).

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2001

51

322

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49:271

instrumental barriers often stem from differences from mainstream society in
academic curriculum or discouragement of the use of technology or modern
communication or transportation. Thus, a person born into Amish society, having
little or no knowledge of computers, automobiles and the like, would find life outside
his or her community far more difficult—and thus would face a much more
extensive litany of instrumental barriers to exit—than would a person having been
born into an RCA. Examples of the second, related type of instrumental barriers
may be found at Harvard College. In light of the at least partially instrumental and
preparatory nature of the community, and the potentially drastic repercussions of exit
from it, particularly where mandated by the administration as dismissal or expulsion,
students will perceive a strong instrumental barrier to exit (or any behavior
jeopardizing their good standing as community members.)
With respect to the question of the role of the state in monitoring the individual
rights of community members, two potential instrumental insufficiencies in
particular deserve additional consideration: (1) the ability of individuals in a
community to self-monitor their own rights, and whether those rights are being
respected by the community; and (2) where those rights are not being sufficiently
respected, their ability to secure external aid in seeking redress. In both cases, as is
also likely for most of these barriers generally, there is a connection between the
presence of these dangers (i.e. inabilities either to self-monitor or to seek redress)
and intense isolation. It would seem that where gemeinschaft relations predominate,
where social pressure is intense, and where community ideology emphasizes
humility and a group-first mentality (for example, in the Oneida Community),
individual members would likely be less able or willing to consider the status of their
own individual rights. Similarly, to the extent that this sort of social control process
differs so radically from the more individualistic, formal, procedural, rights-based
social control processes of mainstream society, even where a members is aware of
the deprivation of his or her rights, external assistance through the courts, for
example, may be insurmountably uncomfortable and alienating for the individual.
Particularly where community members are not made familiar with the origins of
their rights (the Constitution, Federal law, etc.), or with the processes of the law, the
dangers of these inabilities are likely to lurk.152 It may be said, then, that the
presence and degree of these particular inabilities/barriers are likely proportional to
the degree to which a community’s deviance control processes (1) are informal; (2)
promote insularity and internal resolution; (3) rely on and perpetuate gemeinschaft
relations and social pressure; (4) differ in style and format from mainstream
processes; and (5) rely on and promote a group-first mentality. It is these five
considerations, from the perspective of the individual member—affective barriers,
moral barriers, instrumental barriers, ability to self-monitor, and ability to secure
external aid in seeking redress—that support state involvement in the monitoring of
individual rights of members of discrete communities.

152

With these considerations in mind, it seems clear that RCAs, which tend to be less
isolated and to have social control processes not unlike (and indeed relying on) the external
legal system, pose far less of a danger to the rights of individual members. This is probably
also true for the Harvard College community, though, due in part to the youthfulness of
members and the likely increased level of affective ties and gemeinschaft orientations,
probably to a somewhat lesser extent.
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Yet, as the reader has likely recognized in reading this section, it is many of the
same characteristics here considered as potential dangers that are described in the
earlier sections with a far more respectful and appreciative tone. Indeed, where in
this section various characteristics and orientations are described as “barriers,” in
previous sections these same qualities are presented as the reasons why people
decide to become, and to remain as, members. It is precisely these characteristics
that communities rely on as the driving force behind their social control processes.
This is indeed the crux of the issue: many of the qualities, beliefs, and behaviors that
make these communities unique, and upon which their very notions and selfdefinitions of community and identity rest, are at the same time precisely those held
up by outsiders as causes for alarm. Without isolation, the Amish would likely have
dissolved into mainstream culture; without communalism, the Oneida Community
would have lost its unique attraction. Without a common goal or a collective ideal of
a liberal academic community, RCAs and Harvard College would be without a
motivating purpose. And without relying on these characteristics, each respective
community’s deviance control mechanism would be essentially stripped of its ability
to reinforce the defining outer boundary of the community-circle. In short, it is to a
certain degree the very autonomy and independence from the state that allows
communities to define themselves, to attract and perpetuate membership, and to
forge the types of positive affective, moral and instrumental orientations that we
celebrate as the blessings of community. The challenge for the state, then, is to
consider both the needs of communities—to perpetuate their traditions, practices,
relations and beliefs—and the rights of individual members.
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have now explored four different communities. We have considered the
depth of identity formed around the small, isolated, and highly interconnected
communities in Section I. And we have examined the more individualistic nature of
RCAs. We have compared these two types of communities along two axes: (1)
from the perspective of the community as a whole, the relative prominence of
gemeinschaft and gesellschaft relations; and (2) from the perspective of individual
group members, the existence of instrumental, affective, and moral orientations
towards the group. In both instances, we have found the Section I communities at
one end of each spectrum and the RCAs on the other. Further, we have seen how, in
regards to both of these axes, the Harvard College community is something of a
synthesis of the Section I communities and the RCAs. Hopefully, in comparing
these four quite different forms of community, we have begun to understand what is
at the core of these community-tubes, drawing people together in commonality.
We have also seen how each of these communities has a unique device for social
control, protecting the community and its shared belief, values and/or goals from
corruption from within and infiltration from without. From the internal, informal,
participatory, group-oriented devices found within the Section I communities, to the
formal, external, rights-based processes of the RCAs, to Harvard College’s synthesis
of these two extremes, we have seen how a community’s social control mechanisms
can work to reaffirm and perpetuate the core principles and behaviors at the heart of
the community. Thus it is that social control forms a community-tube’s perimeter
boundary.
Finally, we have considered the dangers and limits of community. We have seen
how, in much the same ways that these communities forge unique identities, attract
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membership, and control deviance within their communities, they also can
potentially jeopardize the individual rights and integrity of their members. Where
there are strong affective, moral, and instrumental barriers, and where members are
not sufficiently able either to monitor their own rights or to secure external assistance
in seeking redress, there is great reason for concern. Thus it is our responsibility,
formally as government and informally as a nationwide community bound by a
collective ideology and national conception of rights, to balance communities’ needs
for autonomy and independence with community members’ individual rights.
It has been my contention throughout this paper that a community-tube is the
result of a symbiotic relationship between two aspects: it is the core of shared
values, beliefs, goals, and patterns of behavior, working to inform the perimeter’s
social control function; at the same time it is the mechanism for social control,
through its continual definition and redefinition of acceptable values, beliefs and
behaviors, affirming and reaffirming the commonalities and shared identities that
form the heart of the community. Without a core, there is nothing for the outer
barrier to protect, and without a perimeter there is no boundary to define the outer
limits of acceptability. Yet, the mere presence of these two features is not sufficient;
they must work harmoniously together, each feeding off of each other. Mutual
criticism would have disastrous effects in an RCA, and likely even among the
Amish. Similarly, contract-based litigation would be destructive if relied on by the
Oneida Community, or even by Harvard College.
It may well be true that today’s cross-section out of the community-tube model is
a more complicated picture than what may have been the case a hundred years ago.
With global transportation and communication at our fingertips, we are surely less
isolated than ever before. We can join chat groups with faceless others on the
internet, work for global corporations, and maintain personal contacts with friends
around the world. If nothing else, our community-tubes are no longer strictly
geographically defined. Yet, I do not believe this is an indication of a lack of
community. Rather, it is but another step along our ever-evolving conception of
what community is. There are an infinite number of possible communities, based on
an equally infinite variety of underlying shared principles, beliefs and goals, no two
communities the same and no single one necessarily remaining constant over time.
Where there is a symbiosis of such commonality at the core, and controlling
mechanisms at the outer limits, I believe there also exists a tube of community
possibility.
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